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Nearly fifteen years ago, in response to the proposals of a Joint Commission on
Discovery of the California State Bar and Judicial Council, the California
Legislature enacted the Discovery Act of 1986. That legislation made sweeping
statutory changes that affected all phases of civil discovery practice in the California
state courts. In large part, it codified three decades of case law. In addition, it
imported several ideas from other courts, particularly the federal courts. Finally, it
created some of its own innovations. At least some of the sweeping changes enacted
in 1986 became models for courts in other jurisdictions.
With discovery expenses still occupying the lion's share of pretrial expenses,
and discovery disputes still commonplace, the California Law Revision Commission
has turned its attention toward possible discovery reform. As its starting point, it has
asked for preparation of this paper to provide background research on discovery
laws in other jurisdictions in the United States with an eye toward identifying
potential innovations for the Commission's consideration.'
In response to the Commission's request, the author has examined the discovery
laws in the other forty-nine states, as well as the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the federal courts. As can be expected, in so
broad a survey, hundreds of differences appear from California law. Most of these
differences are not reported in this paper. Many are relatively minor, such as the
number of days that a given jurisdiction permits for an answer to an interrogatory,
the number of days of notice before a deposition may be taken, or the amount of
space that a propounding party must leave on an interrogatory to accommodate the
response. Other differences represent areas where the respective state legislature has
either not yet addressed matters covered by the Discovery Act of 1986, or it has
taken a different path from that adopted by the California Legislature in that Act.2
Out of this sea of differences, the author has fished those which, in the author's
opinion, represent potentially useful approaches to matters not otherwise adequately
addressed in the 1986 Discovery Act.3 In general, these approaches seem to offer the
potential to do some or all of the following: (1) reduce discovery disputes, either by
providing different or clearer expectations of permissible conduct, or by providing
better mechanisms for managing disputes; (2) reduce discovery costs; (3) reduce the
time spent on discovery; (4) respond to technological innovations; or (5) improve
the quality of information produced in response to discovery.4
1. The discovery provisions summarized here are those in effect on January 1, 2001.
2. For example, many states require some or all discovery to be filed with the court. Others permit pre-suit
discovery in order to investigate whether a claim might be brought. In the author's opinion, these types of
"differences" are not "innovations," but, rather, represent rules that were intentionally, and appropriately, rejected
by the Discovery Commission and Legislature when they proposed and adopted the Discovery Act of 1986.
3. The author recognizes that local court rules in California and the practices of individual judges
throughout the state anticipate many of the suggestions noted below. The author, however, has included them here
as they have not otherwise been codified in the Discovery Act of 1986, as amended, as a matter of statewide law.
4. Many of the potential innovations noted below run counter to specific provisions of the Discovery Act
of 1986. With rare exception, the author has not gone back and re-examined the reasoning (or the Reporter's Notes)
taken by the Discovery Commission and Legislature when they considered the 1986 Act. Matters that run counter
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This report proceeds in two parts. The first part addresses those broad rules that
apply across-the-board, without regard to particular discovery devices. These rules
present the most sweeping potential innovations for California to consider. This part
also includes a discussion of mandatory pretrial disclosure; narrowed discovery
relevance; mandatory discovery planning; certification of good faith in the conduct
of discovery; and increased judicial control over discovery. The second part focuses
on each specific discovery device. By far, deposition practice presented the most
potential opportunities for California's consideration. Nevertheless, each of the other
discovery devices-interrogatories, inspection demands, medical examinations,
exchanges of expert witness information, and admission requests-also presented
a few possible innovations.
I. POTENTIAL ACROSS-THE-BOARD INNOVATIONS
A. Mandatory Pretrial Disclosure
The most significant conceptual change in discovery practice has come from the
mandatory pretrial disclosure provisions of Rule 26(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Unlike "discovery," where the burden lies with the party seeking
information to initiate the process via the correct discovery mechanism, "disclosure"
places an independent obligation on each party to produce without a prior request
specific information by specific deadlines. This fundamental shift in pretrial practice
has remained controversial, and its adoption by both state and federal courts has
been slow.
As originally promulgated in 1993, Rule 26(a) required three sets of pretrial
disclosures: (1) initial disclosures, (2) disclosure of expert witness testimony, and
(3) pretrial disclosures. As summarized by the Advisory Committee, the rule
requires all parties: (1) to exchange information early in the case regarding potential
witnesses, documentary evidence, damages, and insurance; 5 (2) at an appropriate
to such specific provisions are included here because, in the author's opinion, they represent matters that should be
reconsidered afresh as part of an overall comprehensive re-evaluation of California civil discovery law. During such
a reconsideration, the collective wisdom of the earlier Joint Commission would, of course, be highly relevant.
5. The "Initial Disclosures" included:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have
discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings, identifying the subjects of the information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents, data compilations, and
tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party that are relevant to disputed
facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, making available
for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary material, not
privileged or protected from disclosure, on which such computation is based, including
materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under which any
person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment
1053
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time during the discovery period, to identify expert witnesses and provide a detailed
written statement of the testimony that may be offered at trial through specially
retained experts;6 and (3) to identify the particular evidence that may be offered at
trial, as the trial date approaches.7
According to the Committee, the disclosure rules were meant to accomplish two
goals: acceleration of the exchange of basic case information and elimination of the
paperwork necessary to request such information, with a concomitant reduction in
time and expense.8 In addition, an unstated but implicit premise, was the fostering
of the search for truth. No longer would one party-or more importantly, one party's
client-be limited to the information it requested. Thus, if within the scope of the
required disclosures, a party that held the "smoking gun" would be forced to turn
over that piece of information regardless of whether the other party's attorney asked
for it.
The disclosure rules generated substantial controversy. Three principal
objections were made. First, critics claimed that the system was unfair since it made
each party's duty to disclose independent of the other party's compliance with its
own disclosure obligations. Thus, one party's failure to disclose did not excuse the
other party from disclosing. This, it was argued, would give an unfair advantage to
the party who failed to disclose.
Second, critics argued that uncertainty over the scope of the required disclosure
would create more paperwork, not less. In particular, they claimed that the triggering
language for two of the initial disclosure obligations-"relevant to disputed facts
which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to
satisfy the judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(A)-(D) (1993) (amended 2000).
6. The "Expert Witness Testimony" provisions require disclosure of "the identity of any person who may
be used at trial to present [expert opinion] evidence." Id. 26(a)(2). Accompanying the revelation of identity is a
required report, "prepared and signed by the witness," containing:
a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor; the data or other
information considered by the witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary
of or support for the opinions; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the study and
testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by
deposition within the preceding four years.
Id. 26(a)(2)(B).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee reports 1 1 (1993). The required "Pretrial Disclosures" include:(A) the name and, if not previously provided, the address and telephone number of each witness,
separately identifying those whom the party expects to present and those whom the party
may call if the need arises;
(B) the designation of those witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by means of
a deposition ... ; [and](C) an appropriate identification ofeach document or other exhibit, including summaries of other
evidence, separately identifying those which the party expects to offer and those which the
party may offer if the need arises.
Id. 26(a)(3)(A)-(C).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee notes 2, 3 (1993).
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alleged with particularity in the pleadings"-invited uncertainty, manipulation and
motion practice.
Finally, and more fundamentally, critics claimed that the disclosure provisions
subverted the adversary system. To comply with the requirements, they argued, a
party's attorney would have to first imagine what information the opposing party's
attorney would consider relevant, and then turn that very evidence over to opposing
counsel. Along the way, counsel would be educating his or her opponent about facts
and theories that opposing counsel might never have considered absent the
disclosure rules. Smart, hard-working, and often higher-priced counsel would be
building the cases for their less-gifted or less-motivated opponents.
Partly due to these criticisms, but largely for other reasons, adoption of the
disclosure requirements-even within the federal courts themselves-has been slow.
As of 1999, only seven states have adopted them all or in part.9 And, until recently,
the disclosure provisions were not in effect in roughly half the federal courts.'0 This
oddity resulted from the generous "opt-out" provisions of Rule 26(a)(1). That
provision allowed district courts, by local rule, to exempt themselves from the
disclosure rules. The opt-out provisions sprang from the timing of the 1993
amendments to Rule 26. Those amendments came just a few years after passage of
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990." As mandated by that Act, the district courts
were required to develop programs to reduce civil litigation delays. The Advisory
Committee recognized that adoption of the mandatory disclosure requirements of
Rule 26(a) might interfere with the delay reduction efforts already underway in
response to the 1990 Act.12 Accordingly, it allowed district courts to exempt
themselves entirely from Rule 26(a).
Given their inconsistent welcome within the federal courts themselves, it is no
surprise that the state courts have been hesitant in experimenting with such changes.
Most apparently have adopted "wait and see" approaches. But the waiting period
may soon be ending, as the federal Judicial Council has recently approved changes
9. These include: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Nevada, Texas and Utah. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(a);
ARiz. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5); COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(a); ILL. SuP. CT. R. 222(a) & (d); NEV. R. Civ. P. 16. 1(b); TEx. R.
Civ. P. ANN. 194.2 (Vernon 2001); UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(a). The Texas provisions, while the most extensive of all,
are demand driven, not automatic. In addition, Kansas and New Hampshire require disclosure of the identify of
testifying experts upon request. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-226(b) (2000); N.H. SUPER CT. R. 35(f). Oregon requires
disclosure, upon request, of insurance agreements only. OR. CT. R. Civ. 36(B)(2). In Connecticut, defenses in
foreclosure or quite title proceedings must be disclosed. CONN. R. SUPER. CT. (Civil) § 13-19. New York's rules set
up "disclosure" requirements, but this is simply New York's nomenclature for standard "discovery" practice. See
N.Y. C.P. L.R. 3101 (Consol. 2001).
10. See Donna Stienstra, Federal Judicial Center Report, Implementation of Disclosure in U.S. District
Courts, With Specific Attention to Courts' Responses to Selected Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26 (1998) at 4, available at http://www.fjc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsflpages/50. 2 (last visited Sept. 4, 2001) (copy
on file with McGeorge Law Review).
It. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Title 1, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 471,472-82).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes 5 (1993).
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to Rule 26(a) that make an amended version of mandatory disclosure the uniform
rule within the federal courts.
In addition to eliminating the "opt-out" option, the 2000 amendments to Rule
26(a) make three key changes to the disclosure obligations. First, they only require
disclosure of information "that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or
defenses, unless solely for impeachment."' 13 This reduces the circumstances where
the disclosing party will have to help make the opposing party's claim (or defense)
for that opposing party. It also breaks the connection between disclosure and the
pleadings. Under the 1993 version of Rule 26(a), disclosure was triggered by
allegations made "with particularity" in the pleadings. This link brought on the
criticism that disclosure would either change federal pleading practice, or lead to a
whole new level of disputes over the meaning of "particularity." Now, however,
disclosure is triggered by the disclosing party's behavior (i.e., the disclosing party's
decision to "use" certain information to develop its claims or defenses), not the
pleading party's behavior.
Second, following the lead of several states, and the local practice of many
federal districts, the rule now exempts a list of eight types of cases.'4 This list is
exclusive; neither the district courts nor individual federal judges can develop local
rules or standing orders that exempt other classes of cases.'" Case specific orders,
however, remain appropriate.
Finally, the rule now allows a party who contends that disclosure is
inappropriate under the circumstances of the case to object to the court.' 6 The court
must rule on the objection and determine which information, if any, needs to be
disclosed by any party.
The few studies that have been done about practice under the disclosure rules
suggest that it has met its basic goals without causing the increase in litigation that
some had predicted. The Judicial Center sponsored an empirical study that indicated
that most attorneys with experience under the system had found the rules
workable.' 7 The scholarship, however, reflects a broader range of reactions to the
rules.'
8
13. Id. 26(a)(1)(A) & (B) (2000).
14. Id. (a)(l)(E). These include: (1) an action for review on an administrative record; (2) a petition for habeas
corpus; (3) a prisoner's action in pro per; (4) an action to enforce or quash an administrative summons or subpoena;(5) an action by the United States to recover benefit payments; (6) an action by the United States to collect on a
guaranteed student loan; (7) ancillary proceedings; and (8) an action to enforce an arbitration award.
15. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's notes 120 (2000).
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(E).
17. Thomas E. Willging, et al., Federal Judicial Center Report, Discovery and Disclosure Practice,
Problems, and Proposals for Change: A Case-based National Survey of Counsel in Closed Federal Civil Cases(1997), available at http://www.fjc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/pages/50.2 (last visited Sept. 4, 2001) (copy on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
18. See, e.g., Anthony J. Divenere & Benita P. Render, Mandatory Disclosure-Success or Failure?, 67
CLEVE. B.J. 16 (1996); Rock, Scissors, Paper: The Federal Rule 26(a)(1) "Gamble" in Iowa, 80 IowA L. REV. 363
(1995).
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Were the Commission to consider adopting mandatory disclosure provisions,
it might consider some of the variations made by the states. For example, Alaska,
Colorado and Utah have all exempted broad classes of cases from disclosure. 9 In
addition, Alaska and Colorado have created separate disclosure provisions for
divorce and domestic relations cases,2° while Arizona has separate rules for medical
malpractice cases.2' Illinois makes disclosure apply only in cases valued at $50,000
or less,22 while Colorado has slightly modified its disclosure rules in such "limited
monetary claim" actions.23 Alaska neatly addresses the timing of discovery in cases
where disclosure does not apply.
24
Three states have addressed the interaction between disclosure obligations, the
law of privilege and work product protection. Alaska clarifies that the work product
protection applies to matters that would otherwise be required to be disclosed.25
Colorado, while less explicit, has a comparable provision.26 Unlike Alaska, Texas
makes the work product protection inapplicable to required disclosure materials.27
Arizona goes further than the federal courts in its disclosure obligations. Unlike
the original version of the federal disclosure provision, Arizona has not limited the
initial disclosure duty to matters "relevant to facts alleged with particularity., 28 In
addition, it expressly imposes a duty of reasonable inquiry prior to disclosure.29
Moreover, in addition to matters required by its federal rule counterpart, it requires
disclosure of: (1) "[t]he factual basis of the claim or defense. In the event of multiple
claims or defenses, the factual basis for each claim or defense[J" (2) "[t]he legal
theory upon which each claim or defense is based including, where necessary for a
reasonable understanding of the claim or defense, citations of pertinent legal or case
19. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(a); COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(a); UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(a).
20. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(a), 26.1 (divorce). COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(a); Rule 26.1 (domestic relations).
21. ARIz. R. CIV. P. 26.2(a). These require the plaintiff, within five days of service on the last defendant, to
serve upon the defendants "copies of all of plaintiff's available medical records relevant to the condition which is
the subject matter of the action." Id. at 26.2(a)(1). In response, defendants must serve similar copies of all of
plaintiffs records that they have. Id. at 26.2(a)(2).
22. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 222(a) & (d).
23. COLO. R. Civ. P. 26.3(c). This rule modifies the time of the general disclosure duties imposed by
Colorado Rule 26(a). In addition, in personal injury cases, it states, "the plaintiff shall disclose all health care
providers and employers for the past ten years, and the defendant shall disclose the present claim case file, including
any evidence supporting affirmative defenses and provide a copy of all insurance policies including each declaration
page." Id.
24. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(d).
25. Id. (a)(1)(d) & (e).
26. COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(6) & 26(e).
27. TEx. R. Civ. P. 194.5.
28. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26.1.
29. Id. 26.1(b)(3).
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authorities[;] '30 and (3) in personal injury or wrongful death cases, the "identity,
location, and the facts supporting the claimed liability" of nonparties.3
Arizona also differs from its federal model as to the consequences of a failure
to disclose. The federal courts absolutely preclude a party at trial from using
material that was required to be-but was not-disclosed.32 Arizona, however,
allows such a use at trial if good cause is shown.33 Finally, rather than making
disclosure occur in conjunction with a pretrial discovery planning conference,
Arizona simply requires disclosure within forty days of the defendant's answer.34
Late disclosure, however, limits subsequent trial use of the material by the
disclosing party.
5
30. Id. 26.1(a). The complete list includes:
(1) The factual basis of the claim or defense. In the event of multiple claims or defenses, the factual
basis for each claim or defense.
(2) The legal theory upon which each claim or defense is based including, where necessary for a
reasonable understanding of the claim or defense, citations of pertinent legal or case authorities.
(3) The names, addresses, and telephone numbers of any witnesses whom the disclosing party expects
to call at trial with a fair description of the substance of each witness' expected testimony.
(4) The names and addresses of all persons whom the party believes may have knowledge or
information relevant to the events, transactions, or occurrences that gave rise to the action, and the
nature of the knowledge or information each such individual is believed to possess.
(5) The names and addresses of all persons who have given statements, whether written or recorded,
signed or unsigned, and the custodian of the copies of those statements.
(6) The name and address of each person whom the disclosing party expects to call as an expert
witness at trial, the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, the substance of the
facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify, a summary of the grounds for each
opinion, the qualifications of the witness and the name and address of the custodian of copies of
any reports prepared'by the expert.
(7) A computation and the measure of damage alleged by the disclosing party and the documents or
testimony on which such computation and measure are based and the names, addresses, and
telephone numbers of all damage witnesses.
(8) The existence, location, custodian, and general description of any tangible evidence or relevant
documents that the disclosing party plans to use at trial and relevant insurance agreements.
(9) A list of the documents or, in the case of voluminous documentary information, a lisi of the
categories of documents, known by a party to exist whether or not in the party's possession,
custody or control and which that party believes may be relevant to the subject matter of the action,
and those which appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and
the date(s) upon which those documents will be made, or have been made, available for inspection
and copying. Unless good cause is stated for not doing so, a copy of each document listed shall
be served with the disclosure. If production is not made, the name and address of the custodian of
the document shall be indicated. A party who produces documents for inspection shall produce
them as they are kept in the usual course of business.
31. Id. 26(b)(5). In cases valued at less than $50,000, Illinois also requires disclosure of the factual and legal
bases of each claim or defense. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 222(d).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(I). If there was substantial justification or if the failure to disclose was harmless,
the material may be used at trial. Id.
33. ARIz. R. Cv. P. 37(c)(l)-(3).
34. Id. 26.1 (b).
35. Id. 37(c)(l)-(3).
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Texas currently has the most extensive disclosure provisions of all the states.
Unlike the federal model, it does not occur automatically, but is initiated by
request.36 Upon request, the opposing party has thirty days to produce:
(a) the correct names of the parties to the lawsuit;
(b) the name, address, and telephone number of any potential parties;
(c) the legal theories and, in general, the factual bases of the responding
party's claims or defenses (the responding party need not marshal all
evidence that may be offered at trial);
(d) the amount and any method of calculating economic damages;
(e) the name, address, and telephone number of persons having knowledge
of relevant facts, and a brief statement of each identified person's
connection with the case;
(f) for any testifying expert:
(1) the expert's name, address, and telephone number;
(2) the subject matter on which the expert will testify;
(3) the general substance of the expert's mental impressions and
opinions and a brief summary of the basis for them, or if the expert
is not retained by, employed by, or otherwise subject to the control
of the responding party, documents reflecting such information;
(4) if the expert is retained by, employed by, or otherwise subject to
the control of the responding party:
(A) all documents, tangible things, reports, models, or data
compilations that have been provided to, reviewed by, or
prepared by or for the expert in anticipation of the expert's
testimony; and
(B) the expert's current resume and bibliography;
(g) any indemnity and insuring agreements described in [another Rule];
(h) any settlement agreements described in [another Rule];
(i) any witness statements described in [another Rule];
(j) in a suit alleging physical or mental injury and damages from the
occurrence that is the subject of the case, all medical records and bills
that are reasonably related to the injuries or damages asserted or, in lieu
thereof, an authorization permitting the disclosure of such medical
records and bills;
(k) in a suit alleging physical or mental injury and damages from the
occurrence that is the subject of the case, all medical records and bills
obtained by the responding party by virtue of an authorization furnished
by the requesting party.
37
36. TEx. R.Civ. P. 194.1.
37. Id. 194.2.
1059
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Texas gives defendants who have not yet answered the complaint additional
time to answer the disclosure request.38 In addition, if the responsive documents are
"voluminous," the responding party can designate "a reasonable time and place for
the production of documents. 39
B. Narrowed Discovery Relevance
For over half a century, the fulcrum upon which broad discovery has rested in
the federal courts has been "relevance to the subject matter involved in the pending
action." Incorporated by the federal rulemakers in the original 1938 version of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, its broad scope was affirmed by the rulemakers
in their 1946 amendments to federal Rule 26. At that time, the rulemakers clarified
that relevant discovery materials also included information that was not "admissible
at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. 4°
In the Discovery Act of 1956, California adopted verbatim the "relevant to the
subject matter" standard. 41 As interpreted by both California and federal courts, this
standard permits discovery of matters beyond the specific factual issues raised by
the pleadings.42
The breadth of discovery permitted by the "relevant to the subject matter"
standard has long been the target of criticism by those who believe that it is
responsible for excessive discovery. A quarter century ago, the American Bar
Association (ABA) proposed amending the standard to one of "relevance to the
issues raised by the claims or defenses of any party., 43 In response, the federal
Advisory Committee toyed with a different possible amendment: "relevance to the
claim or defense" of a party.44 Ultimately, however, it rejected both its own and the
ABA's proposals.45
38. Id. 194.3(a).
39. Id. 194.4.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (1946) (amended 2000).
41. Discovery Act of 1956, ch. 1904, § 3 (current version at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2016). See I JAMES
E. HOGAN & GREGORY S. WEBER, CALIFORNIA CIVIL DISCOVERY 579 (Bancroft-Whitney) (1997) (hereinafter
HOGAN & WEBER).
42. See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 390, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 108, 364 P.2d 266,
284; Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 632 (D. Ut 1998).
43. See Comm. on Rules of Practices & Procedure of the U.S., 85 F.R.D. 539 (1979).
44. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure. 77 F.R.D. 613,627-28
(1978).
45. It was thought that a change in language would lead to endless disputes and uncertainty
about the meaning of the terms "issues" and "claims or defenses." It was objected that
discovery could not be restricted to issues because one of the purposes of discovery was
to determine issues .... Many commentators feared that if discovery were restricted to
issues or claims or defenses there would be a return to detailed pleading or a resort to
"shotgun" pleading, with multitudes of issues, claims and defenses, leading to an increase
in discovery motions without any reduction in discovery.
1060
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In the mid-1980s, the California Discovery Commission considered possible
changes to the broad scope of discovery relevance. In particular, the Commission
considered restricting discovery relevance to the "issues" raised by the standards.
Like its federal counterparts, the Discovery Commission ultimately rejected any
changes.46 Currently, section 2017 of the California Code of Civil Procedure allows
discovery
regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made
in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.47
Two states, however, have adopted the narrower versions of discovery relevance
rejected by the federal rulemakers in the late 1970s. Mississippi Rule 26(b)(1)
adopted the ABA proposal and restricts discovery to matters relevant to "the issues
raised by the claims or defenses" of a party.48 In specified actions, Virginia does
likewise.49 Connecticut Rule 13-2 exemplifies the path not taken by the federal
Advisory Committee. Under that provision, discovery must relate to the "claim or
defense" of any party.50 New York charts a different path altogether. It limits
discovery to matters "material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action."'"
In the 2000 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1), the federal rulemakers have reversed
their earlier opinions, and have now presumptively embraced the narrower
Connecticut-like standard they first considered and rejected in 1978. Under the
Rule's new version, "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party . . . . The
rulemakers did not, however, completely embrace the narrower definition. Rather,
the new standard applies only to "party-controlled" discovery. The courts, however,
"may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action" if "good cause" is shown.53
Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure. 85 F.R.D. 541 (1979).
46. "The Commission feared that in 'issue' standard would produce a dramatic increase both in objections
on relevance grounds, and in the need for trial court intervention to resolve these objections." Reporter's Notes to
Section 2017(a) (quoted in 1 HOGAN & WEBER, supra note 41, 580-81).
47. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2017(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
48. Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
49. VA. SuP. CT. R. Civ. P. 4:1(e) (e.g., divorce).
50. CONN. R. SUPER. CT. (Civil) § 13-2. The rule further restricts discovery to those matters that are within
the "knowledge, possession or power" of the party from whom discovery is sought. In addition, discovery is only
permissible where the burden of obtaining the information would be much greater if discovery were not permitted.
Id.
51. N.YC.P.L.R. 3101 (Consol. 2001).
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
53. Id.
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In explaining its decision to reverse the half-century of broad discovery, the
Advisory Committee noted that, despite its many efforts to reduce overbroad
discovery, "[c]oncerns about costs and delay of discovery have persisted. 5 4 Its own
empirical study suggested that "nearly one-third" of the lawyers surveyed "endorsed
narrowing the scope of discovery as a means of reducing litigation expense without
interfering with fair case resolutions." In apparent response to its earlier concerns
that a new standard would lead to more discovery litigation, the Committee
welcomed more active judicial involvement "in regulating the breadth of sweeping
or contentious discovery."55 Nevertheless, it cautioned:
The dividing line between information relevant to the claims and defenses
and that relevant only to the subject matter cannot be defined with
precision. . . . [ ] The rule change signals to the court that it has the
authority to confine discovery to the claims and defenses asserted in the
pleadings, and signals to the parties that they have no entitlement to
discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are not already identified
in the pleadings. In general, it is hoped that reasonable lawyers can
cooperate to manage discovery without the need for judicial intervention.
When judicial intervention is invoked, the actual scope of discovery should
be determined according to the reasonable needs of the action.56
The 2000 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) make one additional change to the
general scope of discovery. They clarify the relationship between admissibility at
trial and discoverability. The concluding sentence of Rule 26(b)(1) now reads:
"Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."57 The
addition of "relevant" before "information" makes clear that although discoverable
information need not itself be "admissible" at trial, it still must meet the test of
relevance for discovery. Absent the qualification, the Advisory Committee feared
that the language allowing discoverability of information that was not admissible at
trial would swallow the other restrictions on discoverability. 58
C. Mandatory Discovery Planning
No California statute or rule requires mandatory discovery planning by the
parties or discovery supervision by the courts. Of course, parties may always
voluntarily cooperate on discovery planning and, in individual cases, courts may
54. Id. advisory committee notes 28 (2000).
55. Id. at 129.
56. Id. at 130.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
58. Id. 26(b)(1) advisory committee notes 32 (2000).'
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supervise discovery planning in conjunction with their general case management
venues, such as settlement or status conferences. But, as a matter of law, none of
these actions are routinely required. Rather, under the 1986 Discovery Act, each
party chooses for itself whether, how, and when to engage in the various forms of
discovery without regard to what another party has done or plans to do. Indeed, the
other party may get no notice of its opponent's strategic decisions until served with
a formal discovery demand; advance notice is a matter of opposing counsel's grace.
And the recipient of a notice who has objections with the manner or matter for
discovery is placed in a reactive position and must decide one of the following: 1)
do nothing and see if the other side responds; 2) file objections and then wait to see
if the other side moves to compel; or 3) go to court now and demand a protective
order.
The 1986 Discovery Act made great progress in requiring the parties to manage
their reactions. In virtually every situation where one party objects to the time, place,
manner or subject of discovery, that party may not seek judicial intervention until
he or she has "met and conferred" with opposing counsel in a good faith attempt to
resolve the dispute. But the 1986 Discovery Act does nothing to attempt to avoid
possible problems before they occur.59
In contrast to the Discovery Act's hands-off approach, both the federal
rulemakers, and many of the states, have embraced formal discovery planning
mechanisms. These mechanisms require the parties to act together to develop a
discovery plan to present to the court. The federal rules generally go the farthest in
these requirements. Beginning with their 1993 amendments to Rule 26, the
rulemakers have required the parties to meet early 6° in the case
to discuss the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the
possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the case, to make or
arrange for [required disclosures], and to develop a proposed discovery
plan.6'
The rule further specifies that the plan must contain four elements: (1) any
changes to the required disclosures; (2) "the subjects on which discovery may be
59. Indeed, in its preservation of limited "holds" on a plaintiff's discovery until 10 days after the defendant
is served, the 1986 Act actually encourages rapid initiation of discovery by defendants. A defendant who perceives
a strategic advantage in initiating discovery before the plaintiff can has little incentive to attempt to cooperate in
framing a mutually acceptable discovery plan.
60. Under the 1993 version, the parties needed to meet "as soon as practicable and in any event at least 14
days before a scheduling conference is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b)." The 2000 amendments
to Federal Rule 26(f) extend that period to 21 days. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
Under Rule 16(b), a scheduling order must issue "as soon as practicable but in any event within 90 days after
the appearance of a defendant and within 120 days after the complaint has been served on a defendant." FED. R. Civ.
P. 16(b). Combining the provisions of 16(b) and 26(0, the parties' discovery planning meeting must occur within
69 days of a defendant's appearance and within 99 days of service upon a defendant.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (1993) (amended 2000).
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needed, when it should be completed, and whether discovery should be conducted
in phases or be limited or focused upon particular issues;" (3) any limitations on
discovery; and (4) any protective orders and case scheduling orders.62 According to
the Advisory Committee's notes, the parties "should also discuss... what additional
information, although not subject to the disclosure requirements, can be made
available informally without the necessity for formal discovery requests., 63 The
Advisory Committee also acknowledged the possibilities that the parties may not be
able to reach agreement. In such cases, resolution of the dispute is left for the court
when it issues its initial scheduling orders. 64 Sanctions are possible for failure to
cooperate meaningfully.
65
To varying extent, discovery planning mechanisms have been adopted by other
states. Adoptions generally follow two different models. Like the federal courts, a
half-dozen states make planning meetings mandatory in all cases.66 In these states,
as in the federal courts, absent a court order, discovery may not occur prior to the
planning meeting.67 More states, however, make the planning meetings optional
61unless ordered by the courts either sua sponte or after motion. In some of these
states, the meetings can become required if either party requests one.69
Texas has now upped the federal ante through enactment of the most sweeping
mandatory discovery "planning" provisions to be found in this survey. Under Texas
law, every case must be governed by a "discovery control plan."70 Plaintiffs indicate
which of three separate "levels" of discovery will be pursued. Level 1 applies to
suits involving $50,000 or less, unless the parties stipulate otherwise; Level 2
applies to cases of more than $50,000 except those cases, deemed Level 3, where
the court crafts an individual control plan. 71 For each level, the rules specify
schedules and presumptive limits. For example, for Level 1, each party is allowed
six hours total for all its depositions and twenty-five written interrogatories; this
62. Id. The 2000 amendments keep these requirements intact.
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee notes $ 49 (1993).
64. Id. 51.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(f); COLO. R. Civ. P. 16; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 218; NEV. R. Civ. P. 16.1 (b);
TEX. R. Civ. P. 190; UTAH R. Civ. P. 2 6(g). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-5, R.26(f) (requiring mandatory
planning conferences only in medical malpractice cases).
67. Cf. COLO. R. Civ. P. 26.3(d)(1)(B) (explaining in cases valued at $50,000 or less, "all forms of discovery
may be had immediately after the case is at issue and without completion of the [mandatory conferences]").
68. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 26(f); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 26(f); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 26(g); HAW. R.
Civ. P. 26(f); IowA R. Civ. P. 124.2; MD. CIRC. CT. R. 2-401; MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.06; Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(c); MONT.
R. Civ. P. 26(f); N.M. DIST. CT. R. Civ. P. 26(f); N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-5, R. 26 (f) (optional except in medical
malpractice cases, where it is required); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 3226(f). S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(f); TENN. R. Civ.
P. 26(f); VT. R. Civ. P. 26(f); WASH. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. P. 26(f); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
69. MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.06, Miss. R. CIV.P. 26(c), MONT. R. Civ. P. 26(f). Compare MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.06
(providing comments that show that discovery planning is to be the norm) with Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (providing
comments that show that discovery planning meetings are to be the exception, not the norm).
70. TEx. R. Civ. P. 190.1
71. Id. 190.2, 190.3 & 190.4.
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discovery may occur up to thirty days before trial.72 For Level 2, each side is given
a maximum of fifty hours in depositions and twenty-five interrogatories; this
discovery must occur no later than the earlier of thirty days before trial or nine
months after the first deposition was held or the first response to written discovery
was made.73
California's sole statewide provision on discovery planning is found in Rule 212
of the California Rules of Court. That rule addresses optional case management
conferences in general. These conferences "may be held if requested by all parties
or ordered by the court, either on its own motion or on the noticed motion of a
party., 74 Prior to any such conference, the parties must "meet and confer" to address,
among other topics, "preliminary schedules of discovery." Each participant must
produce a case management conference statement that "shall discuss the areas of
agreement and disagreement between the parties on each of the required subjects.
75
To date, the little empirical evidence that exists regarding the usefulness or
effectiveness of mandatory discovery planning suggests that it can provide benefits
with few perceived drawbacks. The 1997 Federal Judicial Center study concluded
that of those attorneys who had "met and conferred" to plan discovery, the majority
did not think that meeting and conferring had any effect on litigation
expenses, disposition time, fairness, or the number of issues in the case. For
those who thought there had been an effect, however, the effect was most
often in the desired direction: lower litigation expenses, shortened
disposition time, greater procedural fairness, greater outcome fairness, and
fewer issues in the case. 76
California's optional, nonstatutory, vague discovery planning rule deserves closer
review.
D. Certification of Compliance
A fourth federal inspired development in discovery law is certification of good
faith compliance with discovery rules. Federal Rule 26(g) requires each party or
party's attorney to sign disclosure and discovery requests, responses and objections.
The signature is "designed to prevent seemingly proper discovery that is grossly
disproportionate to the case, unduly burdensome, or intended to harass the opposing
72. Id. 190.2(b)(2) & (3). Without a court order, the parties may agree to extend this amount to up to 10
hours total. Id. 190.2(b)(2).
73. Id. 190.3(b)(2) & (3). If one side designates more than two experts, the other side is given six additional
hours of deposition time for each additional designated expert. Id. 190.3(b)(2).
74. CAL. R. CT. 212(a) (emphasis added).
75. Id. 212(c).
76. Willging, supra note 18, at 31-32.
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party., 77 A signature on a disclosure "constitutes a certification that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information and belief, formed after a reasonable inquiry, the
disclosure is complete and correct as of the time it is made. 78 A signature on a
discovery request, response or objection certifies that it is
(A) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (B)
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (C) not
unreasonably or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the
case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.79
Sanctions, including reasonable attorney's fees, are imposable for improper
certifications.8° These sanctions are in addition to sanctions imposable under Rule
37 for failure to make disclosure or to cooperate in discovery8
The Rule 26(g) certification provision is similar to the general federal
certification requirement set out in Rule 11. The latter governs all papers filed in
federal court actions except those involved with discovery. Rule 26, however, tailors
the certification standards to the circumstances of discovery and disclosure. Unlike
Rule 11, it requires that requests are not "unreasonable" or "unduly expensive or
burdensome." Sanctions, however, are not imposable on the certifying attorney's
law firm, as they can be under Rule 11. Courts may impose Rule 26 sanctions on
their own motion; there is no "safe harbor" or withdrawal provision applicable; and
unlike the discretionary Rule 11 sanctions, sanctions are mandatory under Rule 26
"unless substantial justification" is shown.
By statute, California adopted Rule 11.82 And like its federal counterpart,
California's certification statute does not apply to discovery papers.83 But, unlike the
federal system, California has no direct equivalent to Rule 26(g). Instead, the only
sanctions in California that are available for noncompliance with the discovery laws
are those that are the device-specific equivalents of the sanctions available under
federal Rule 37.84
77. WILLIAM SCHWARZER, ETAL., Civil Procedure Before Trial-Federal 11:260 (The Rutter Group 2001).
78. FED R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1).
79. Id. 26(g)(2).
80. Id. 26(g)(3).
81. See Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239, 245 (1st Cir. 1992) (providing sanctions under prior
version of Rule 26(g) even if no prior discovery order has been violated).
82. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
83. Id. § 12 8.7 (g) (Supp. 2001).
84. See generally 2 JAMES E. HOGAN & GREGORY S. WEBER, CALIFORNIA CIVIL DISCOVERY ch. 14.
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To date, only about a dozen states have expressly adopted Rule 26's certification
requirements.85 In many other states, however, the general certification requirements
of their equivalent to Rule 11 would appear to apply to discovery.
86
E. Judicial Control Over Discovery
Originally, discovery was meant to be self-executing, with minimal judicial
involvement. Increasingly, however, courts have taken a more active role in
discovery management. This active role includes the resolution of discovery
disputes, the enforcement of discovery rules via orders and sanctions, and, more
recently, the proactive control of the process, through conferences and scheduling
orders.
Both the mechanisms for invoking judicial supervision and the standards to
guide that intervention have received some attention in other jurisdictions. For
example, as discussed more fully below, many jurisdictions place tighter limits than
California on the presumptive number of interrogatories and depositions that can be
obtained without permission from the court or opposing counsel. Indeed, one state,
Colorado, goes so far as to preclude the parties from stipulating away the
presumptive numerical limits-any excess requires judicial permission.87 In addition
to these limits, several jurisdictions require a much stronger showing than California
in order to overcome the presumptive limit. As noted below, California simply
requires a propounding party to file a "declaration of need" for additional
discovery.88 Moreover, California summarizes the courts' ability to limit discovery
in section 2019(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under that section,
The court shall restrict the frequency or extent of use of these discovery
methods if it determines either of the following: (1) the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other
source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (2) the
selected method of discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking
into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.89
85. MICH. R. Civ. P. 2.302(g); N.C. Gen. Stat. § lA-I, R. 26(g); N.D. R. Civ. P. 26(0; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 3226(g); PA. R. Civ. P. 1023 (in pleading provision); S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(g); TENN. R. Civ. P. 26(a); VT. R.
Civ. P. 26(g); VA. SUP. CT. R. Civ. P. 4.1 (g); WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. 26(g); WYo. R. Civ. P. 26(g). See also COLO.
R. Civ. P. 16(b)(l)(iv) (certifying that counsel has informed the client of the likely discovery expenses); N.J. CT.
R. 4:18-4 (certifying that all reports of testifying experts have been turned over to opposing counsel) & 4:23
(certifying that client has been informed that the client is in default for failing to answer interrogatories).
86. See, e.g., ALASKA CT. R. Civ. P. 11 (no provision comparable to FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (d)).
87. COLO. R. Civ. P. 29. Cf D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 28 (parties may not stipulate to deadline extensions;
those are governed exclusively by Rule 16 scheduling orders).
88. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2030(c) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001) (interrogatories). Id. § 2033(c) (admission
requests) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
89. Id. § 2019(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
1067
2001 / Potential Innovations in Civil Discovery
These limitations, however, may only be imposed if a party moves for a protective
order; the statute does not give the court power to act sua sponte.90
In contrast, the federal courts provide the prime example of an affirmative
showing that must be made to obtain permission. Moreover, Federal Rule 26(b)(2)
both sets out the showing required to overcome presumptive limits, and gives the
court discretionary authority to place even tighter limits on discovery. That rule
provides:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise
permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall be limited by the
court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking
discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain
the information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the
issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed
discovery in resolving the issues. The court may act upon its own initiative
after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Rule 26(c). 9'
Colorado echoes the federal provision, but adds an additional consideration:
"Whether because of the number of parties and their alignment with respect to the
underlying claims and defenses, the proposed discovery is reasonable. '92 In contrast
to the California provision, the federal and Colorado provisions provide more details
on the factors necessary to guide the court's discretion. More importantly, they
expressly recognize the court's power to act on it own initiative.
Beyond these two general provisions, several additional potential innovations
address the mechanics of invoking judicial control. In a practice now widely
copied,93 California requires that, in virtually every discovery dispute, the parties
90. Id. § 2017(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) (2000 amendments). In its comments to the 2000 amendments to Federal Rule
26(b), the federal Advisory Committee noted:
The Committee has been told repeatedly that courts have not implemented these limitations with the
vigor that was contemplated. See 8 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2008.1 at 121. This otherwise
redundant cross-reference has been added to emphasize the need for active judicial use of subdivision
(b)(2) to control excessive discovery. Cf Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584, 1597 (1998) (quoting
Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) and stating that "Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery
narrowly").
92. COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(iv).
93. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d).
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"meet and confer" in order to attempt to work out the dispute in good faith.94
Occasionally, obstreperous opposing counsel block these efforts to "meet and
confer." Many courts have informal standards governing the extent to which one
party must attempt to meet the other prior to filing its motions. In one court system,
the practical scope of the "meet and confer" obligation has received formal attention
in its discovery rules. In the District of Columbia, the requirement is deemed
fulfilled if, ten days before filing a discovery motion, counsel sends a letter to
opposing counsel proposing a meeting date and makes two follow-up phone calls
attempting to negotiate that date.95 If, despite these efforts, agreement cannot be
reached, the requirement to "meet and confer" is deemed met.
Delaware also addresses the amount of effort required to satisfy the "meet and
confer" requirement, although it does not have a "deemed met" standard like the
District of Columbia rule. Instead, Delaware specifies that any motion to compel
must detail "the dates, time spent, and method of communication with the other
party or parties and the results, if any, of such communication. 96 In a further effort
to reduce the burden on the judiciary, Delaware places tight formal restrictions on
motions to compel, including: (1) a four-page limit on both the motion and any
response which "shall contain all authorities and facts which the moving party
desires to bring to the attention of the Court"; (2) the waiver of any objection by
failure to file a response; (3) the prohibition of a written reply to the response; (4)
the limit of fifteen minutes total for oral argument, divided equally between the
sides; (5) the summary granting, or denial, of the motion, as the case may be, if
either side does not show up for the oral argument; (6) a mandatory attorney's fee
of not less than one-hundred dollars against the nonappearing party; and (7) a
prohibition against any further filings in the case from the nonappearing party until
the fee has been paid.97
Maine goes furthest in its control of access to the courts to force intervention.
Maine requires prior court approval before a party may file any discovery motion.98
In effect, Maine thus gives the courts an opportunity to prescreen the amount of
"meeting and conferring" that has occurred in the dispute, and to direct further,
perhaps more focused, efforts. Maine, however, relents in one area: where there has
been a complete failure to respond to a discovery request, Maine permits ex parte
rulings.99
94. E.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2030(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001) (meet and confer prior to filing a
motion to compel further responses to interrogatories). The lone exception is when there has been a complete failure
to respond. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2030(k).
95. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 26(h).
96. DEL. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(1).
97. Id. 37(e)(2)-(8).
98. ME. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1).
99. Id. 26(g)(2).
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Illinois addresses a plaintiff's strategic manipulation of discovery law through
voluntary dismissals. It precludes avoidance of discovery compliance or deadlines
by a voluntary dismissal followed by a refiling of the case.'0°
Several jurisdictions mandate the contents of any motion to compel. These
courts require the moving party to either attach or set out in full a copy of the
request and the response.'°0
Sanctions have received attention in many jurisdictions, with several paths
charted that are different from the California approach. In general, like most
jurisdictions, 0 2 California envisions a two-step approach to sanctions. In the first
step, a party unhappy with a discovery response and unable to work out an informal
resolution with opposing counsel, must move to compel further response to
discovery.'0 3 If that motion is granted, the court ordinarily grants the moving party
"a monetary sanction."' °4 If the recalcitrant party then disobeys the order compelling
further response, the party who obtained the order may seek a second order
imposing a harsher sanction, such as the "the imposition of an issue sanction, an
evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction .... In lieu of or in addition to that
sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction."' 0'
In contrast to this two-step approach, Rhode Island allows its court to make the
initial order to compel self-executing. Under that approach, the recalcitrant party's
failure to comply with the order within the specified time period will automatically
put that party in default or support an order of dismissal.'0 6
The federal courts, and many states, make a party's complete failure to respond
to a discovery request potentially subject to an immediate terminating sanction.10 7
New Hampshire and New Jersey take a stronger approach, allowing the demanding
party to have the recalcitrant party's conditional default entered.0 8
Maryland specifically addresses the circumstances where a court orders a
defendant's default for failure to obey a motion to compel. It requires the court to
ensure that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant and then tells the court
100. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 219(e).
101. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 37(a); IowA R. Civ. P. 121.1; VT. R. Civ. P. 26(h) (unless reason for motion
is complete failure to respond, party moving to compel must concisely describe the case, list verbatim the items of
discovery sought or opposed and the reason why it should be allowed or denied).
102. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
103. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2030(1) (West 1998) (response to interrogatories).
104. Id. The sanctions can be excused if the court finds that the recalcitrant party "acted with substantial
justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust." Id.
105. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2030(l) (West 2001); cf CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE'§ 2023 (West 1998 & Supp.
2001).
106. R.I. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(a).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d); MASS. R. CIv. P. 33(a); N.H. R. Civ. P. 36.
108. N.H. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 36; N.J. CT. R. 4:23-5 (default without prejudice entered; can be cured by
"motion to restore pleading" made within 90 days of entry).
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what it may consider when setting damages, specifically guaranteeing any right of
the plaintiff to a jury trial. 109
A half-dozen states address the award of sanctions against the state itself or one
of its political subdivisions. Most which have such provisions preclude the awarding
of sanctions absent express statutory authority. 110 Idaho, however, indicates that such
awards are presumptively proper."t '
Finally, Arizona, Idaho and Illinois expressly give their courts substantial
residual authority to craft sanctions for objectionable conduct. Arizona allows its
courts to sanction any "unreasonable, groundless, abusive, or obstructionist
conduct..,".2 Idaho gives its courts "discretion [to] impose sanctions or conditions,
or assess attorney's fees costs or expenses against a party or the party's attorney for
failure to obey [a discovery] order .... 13 Illinois gives its court power to sanction
any willful violations of the discovery rules. 1
4
F Presuit Discovery
Like most states, under conditions specified by statute, California allows a
person who may become a party to a lawsuit that has yet been filed to petition to the
court for an order allowing the preservation of testimony via depositions, inspection
demands, and medical examinations. 15 It makes any such presuit deposition
admissible if taken under the California Code, the federal rules, or "comparable
provisions of the laws of another state."' 16
Although infrequently used, the text is ambiguous and could be improved; it
does not clarify whether the deposition must have been taken under the laws of the
state in which it was taken, or just "another state." Both the federal courts and
several other states, however, clarify that such depositions are admissible not if
taken just under the laws of another state, but if "it would be admissible in evidence
in the courts of the state in which it was taken."'".7 Michigan places a caveat on the
admissibility of depositions taken under laws of other jurisdictions: the deposition
procedure actually used must still have been "in substantial compliance" with
Michigan rules." 8
109. MD. CIR. CT. R. 2-433.
110. ARK. R. CIV. P. 37(e); HAw. R. Civ. P. 37(e); Ky. R. Civ. P. 37.05; MASS. R. Civ. P. 37(e); N.D. R. Civ.
P. 37(f).
11. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 37(f). Cf. P.R. R. Civ. P. 34.5 (court may award expenses against the commonwealth
but not attorney's fees).
112. ARIz. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
113. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 37(e).
114. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(d).
115. CAL. CIV. PROC- CODE § 2035 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
116. Id. § 2035(g).
117. FED.R. Civ. P. 27(a)(4); IND. R. Civ. P. 27(A)(4).
118. MICH. CT. R. 2.303(A)(4)(b).
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Maine expressly authorizes the recording of a presuit deposition in the registry
of deeds. " 9 Vermont mandates such filing. 20
Louisiana has extensive provisions governing the issuance of ex parte orders to
take the presuit deposition of someone who is about to die or become
incapacitated.1
2
'
Finally, Ohio and Oklahoma specify that a petition can be made even if it is not
the petitioner but rather his or her heirs or representatives who will be the parties to
the action that cannot yet be brought. 122 Ohio also specifies that the deposition costs
must be born by the petitioning party. 23
G. Miscellaneous Potential General Innovations
This final section addresses a handful of unrelated provisions that, in and of
themselves, would not justify substantial attention, but might be worth considering
as part of an overall reconsideration of California discovery law.
Like some states, such as Florida, 24 California currently imposes no duty upon
a party responding to an interrogatory to automatically supplement the information
provided in that initial response. Instead, California requires the demanding party
to send supplemental interrogatories if it wants to be assured that it has the most
current and accurate information. 25 This provision was evidently adopted in 1986
with some thought, as it was contrary to the then-longstanding federal practice. 126
As part of any reevaluation of its own discovery law, California should revisit this
provision. It remains contrary to current federal law 127 and the law of a number of
other states. 12
8
Section 2024 of the California Code of Civil Procedure sets a discovery cut-off
that is calculated by counting backwards thirty days from "the date initially set for
119. ME. R. Civ. P. 27(c).
120. VT. R. Civ. P. 27(c).
121. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1430 (West 2000).
122. OHIO R. Civ. P. 27; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3227 (West 2000).
123. OHIO R. Civ. P. 27.
124. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(e).
125. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2030(c)(8) (West 1998).
126. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) B 61-65 advisory committee's notes to 1970 amendments.
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e).
128. CONN. R. SUPER. CT. (Civil) 13-15 (must supplement if failure to amend earlier response is a knowing
concealment); IowA R. Civ. P. 122(d) (extensive duties to supplement identities of knowledgeable and expert
witnesses and any material claims or defenses); KY. R. Civ. P. 26.05 (like Iowa); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1428
(West/year) (like Iowa); ME. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (like Iowa); MICH. CT. R. 2.302(e) (like Iowa); MINN. R. Civ. P. 26.05
(duty to supplement information regarding experts and their proposed testimony); N.J. CT. R. 4:17-4 (must
supplement interrogatory answers no later than 20 days before the start of trial); NEv. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (like
current federal provision); P.R. R. Civ. P. 23.1(d) ("continuing duty" imposed); R.I. R. CIV. P. 26(e) & 33(c)
(continuing duty to answer interrogatories); S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (continuing requests under Rules 31, 33, 34 & 36);
TEx. R. Civ. P. 193.5; VT. R. Civ. P. 26 (e) (like current federal provision). Cf. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 214 (duty to
supplement responses to inspection demands).
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the trial of the action." 129 Several states, however, determine the end of the discovery
period by the passage of time from certain events rather than time before other
events. These methods offer 'parties the incentive to move cases forward. Georgia
ends discovery six months after the defendant files its answer. 13° New Jersey
requires discovery to begin within forty days from the end of the time allowed for
the last responsive pleading; it must end within one-hundred and fifty days of
service upon the defendant. 131 Puerto Rico has the tightest discovery schedule of all.
It requires discovery to be completed within sixty days of the service of the
answer. 132 Finally, for cases valued at more than $50,000, Texas requires discovery
to end at the earlier of thirty days before trial or nine months after either the first
deposition was taken or the first answer to written discovery was served, whichever
came first. 1
33
Three states have work product provisions worth noting. Illinois allows the court
to apportion the costs of any attorney work product that is otherwise discoverable. 
134
In an exception to the work product protection, Minnesota allows any person or
party to obtain a copy of any person's prior statement. 35 Pennsylvania echoes that
approach. It authorizes any person to get a photostatic copy of a prior statement that
person made, or any party made, or a witness made, regardless of how it was
recorded. 36 Pennsylvania's general work product protection, however, is worded
strongly. Like the federal provision,'37 and unlike California, ' 38 it expressly extends
beyond an attorney's work to protect from discovery the work of other party
representatives. 139 It also expressly bars from disclosure such classic attorney work
product as case valuation, analyses of the merits of claims or defenses, and strategy
and tactics.140 Moreover, for nonattorney party representatives, the express bar
extends to "disclosure of his or her mental impressions, conclusions or opinions
respecting the value or merit of a claim or defense or respecting strategy or
tactics."''
129. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2024(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
130. GA. SUPER. CT. R. 5.1 (2000).
131. N.J. CT. R. 4:17-2 (service of initial interrogatories), 4:24-1 (completion of discovery).
132. P.R. R. Civ. P. 23.4.
133. TEx. R. Civ. P. 190.3(b)(1)(B)(ii).
134. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 201(b)(2).
135. MiNN. R. Civ. P. 26.02(c).
136. PA. R. Civ. P. 4003.4.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
138. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2017 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001) (attorney's work product). The work product
of other party representatives, however, is protected through the requirement that "good cause" exist for an
inspection demand. See HOGAN & WEBER, supra note 41, at § 13.3.
139. PA. R. Civ. P. 4003.3.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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Other provisions worth noting are: Illinois calculates time periods not in
multiples of five days but in multiples of seven. This calculation makes it easier to
relate compliance schedules with calendar weeks.142
Nevada allows later joined parties to formally demand copies of all prior
discovery responses; 43 New York has provisions within its discovery rules
addressing the appointment of referees;' 44 Oregon has a specific provision
authorizing the court to shift a responding party's discovery costs to the requesting
party "to prevent hardship."'
145
1I. POTENTIAL DEVICE-SPECIFIC INNOVATIONS
A. Deposition Practice
Of all the discovery devices, deposition practice has by far received the most
extensive attention by federal and state courts across the country. Courts that have
been concerned about problems in deposition practice have made a half-dozen major
changes, and many more minor changes.
1. Presumptive Limits on the Number of Depositions
Current California law permits only a single deposition of a natural person.146
It places no other presumptive limits on the number of depositions that may be taken
in a case. 147 The lack of presumptive limits on deposition practice contrasts with the
presumptive limits California places on other discovery devices, such as
interrogatories and admission requests.
In comparison, since 1993, the federal rules have presumptively limited
depositions to ten per side. 48 That is, all of the plaintiffs collectively may take only
ten depositions; all of the defendants collectively may take only ten; and all third-
parties collectively may take only ten. According to the Advisory Committee, this
limit "emphasize[s] that counsel have a professional obligation to develop a mutual
cost-effective plan for discovery in the case."'' 49
142. See, e.g., ILL. SuP. CT. R. 215(c) (21 day period for completion of medical examiner's report); id. at
216(c) (matters deemed admitted unless response to admission request made within 28 days of service of request).
143. NEV. R. Civ. P. 26(h).
144. N.Y. C. P. L.R. § 3104 (McKinney 2001).
145. OR. R. Civ. P. 36(c).
146. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2025(t) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001). For good cause shown, an additional
deposition of a natural person may be taken. Id. Cf S.C. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2) (one deposition limit applies to
organizations as well).
147. A party, of course, may move for a protective order to challenge the propriety of any individual
deposition. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2025(i)(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 2019(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A).
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 30 advisory committee's note 91 3 (1993).
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With only a couple exceptions, the specific federal limits have not been copied
by the states. 150 Rather, of the states that have placed presumptive limits on the
number of depositions have placed much more stringent limits. Alaska limits
depositions to three per side, not counting depositions of parties and testifying
experts. 15' Colorado goes even further. It limits each side to a total of three, of which
one can be of an adverse party and two may be of other persons. 52 Arizona and
Illinois take a different path. Arizona puts no limits on the total number of
depositions, but, absent agreement or court order, it does not allow any depositions
of nonparties, other than experts or custodians of documents. 153 Similarly, in cases
valued at less than $50,000, Illinois only allows depositions of parties and testifying
treating physicians and opinion witnesses.
154
Texas takes a very different approach. It puts no limit on the number of
depositions; rather, it puts a limit on the total number of hours of deposition that
each side can take. In cases valued $50,000 or less, it allows each party six hours
total for examination and cross-examination of witnesses. 55 In other cases, it limits
the total deposition time to fifty hours per side, with additional time permitted if the
opposing side designates more than two experts as trial witnesses. 1
56
2. Presumptive Limits on the Lengths of Depositions
California statutes put no presumptive limit on the length of a deposition. A
party or nonparty deponent who believes that a deposition either has, or will, take
too much time, must move for a case-specific protective order.'57
In contrast, at least seven states have placed presumptive limits on the lengths
of depositions. In Alaska, absent court order or stipulation, depositions of parties,
independent expert witnesses and treating physicians may last only six hours. 158 All
other depositions may presumptively last no more than three hours. 159 Oklahoma and
150. See UTAH R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2) (following federal model); WYO. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2) (same).
151. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A). It also limits the total number of expert witnesses to 3 per side. ALASKA
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D).
152. COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
153. ARiz. R. Civ. P. 30(a).
154. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 222(f)(2)(a)-(b).
155. TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.2(c)(2). The parties may agree among themselves to expand this to 10 hours per side,
but need court permission to exceed that limit. Id.
156. TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.3(b)(2). For each expert beyond two, an additional 6 hours of deposition time is
permitted. Id. More complicated cases, where discovery is controlled by court orders, may have very different limits.
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.4.
157. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2025(i)(5) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
158. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2).
159. Id. A party seeking to overcome the presumption must show the court, among other matters, that "the
complexity of the case, the number of parties likely to examine a deponent, and the extent of relevant information
possessed by the deponent" justify a longer length. Id.
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Texas have similar six hour limits. 6° Arizona places even tighter limits. Absent
stipulation or order, no deposition of any witness, including experts, may last more
than four hours.' 6 1 In cases valued at less than $50,000, Illinois places stringent
deposition limits. It presumptively limits all depositions to three hours. 162 Maine and
Montana provide more generous limits. In both of those states, absent stipulations
or orders to the contrary, depositions are limited to eight hours. 163
The decision by these states to presumptively limit the length of a deposition has
recently received a federal imprimatur. Under the 2000 amendments to federal Rule
30, a deposition may presumptively last only for "one day of seven hours. ' 6 The
limitation does not include "reasonable breaks during the day for lunch and other
reasons, and ... the only time to be counted is the time occupied by the actual
deposition."'165 Additional time may be ordered "if needed for a fair examination of
the deponent or if the deponent or another person, or another circumstance, impedes
or delays the examination."'' 66 As examples of cases where more time may well be
justified, the Advisory Committee included depositions using interpreters, questions
about numerous or lengthy documents which the deponent had not read in advance,
multi-party cases where different parties have a need to examine the witness from
different perspective, and depositions of expert witnesses. 167
3. Deposition Behavior
The California discovery statutes have two provisions governing deposition
misconduct in general and the making of objections in particular. Under section
2025(n) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, a deposition may be stopped to
allow a party or the deponent to "move for a protective order on the ground that the
examination is being conducted in bad faith or in a manner that unreasonably
annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses that deponent or party."'168 The statute gives no
examples of specific bad faith or unreasonable conduct. Section 2025(m) addresses
the circumstances when an objection must be made in order to avoid a waiver of the
grounds for the objection should the deposition be used as evidence in a subsequent
160. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3230(A)(3). The deposition must be held between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
on weekdays. Id. TEX. R. Civ. P. 199.5(c) (breaks not included).
161. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(d). The fours hours may be spread over two days. Absent a stipulation or order to
the contrary, a deposition noticed for a given day continues the next day until done. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 30(c).
162. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 222(a), (0(2).
163. ME. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2); MONT. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(8).
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2).
165. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d) advisory committee's note T 3 (2000).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2025(a).
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proceeding.169 It does not, however, specifically address the misuse of deposition
objections. A frequent misuse is pointed coaching of the witness.
In contrast, both the federal courts and an increasing number of states have
language to address the improper use of objections during deposition testimony.
Louisiana simply reserves all objections to deposition testimony.' 70 Texas limits
objections to three: "objection, leading," "objection, form," and "objection, non-
responsive."'' These objections are waived if not stated "as phrased.' 72 Maryland
does not require the grounds of objections to be stated, unless a request for grounds
is made by any party.173 In addition, if an objection "reasonably could have the
effect of coaching or suggesting to the deponent how to answer, then the deponent,
at the request of any party, shall be excused from the deposition during the making
of the objection."' 174 Michigan requires a party who knows that it will be asserting
a privilege at a deposition to move to prevent the taking of the deposition or be
subject to specified Costs. 175
The federal rule now states:
Any objection during a deposition must be stated concisely and in a non-
argumentative and non-suggestive manner. A person may instruct a
deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to
enforce a limitation directed by the court, or to [move for a protective
order]. 176
Similar provisions are found in Alaska, Arizona, Oregon, Maryland, Texas,
Washington and South Carolina, with Maryland further expressing its concern in the
form of its official Guidelines for Discovery.t 77 In addition, six of these states,
169. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2025(m)(1)-(3), (u)(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001) (citing such examples
as privilege, cure of defects, and lack of competency as grounds for objection).
170. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1443(d) (West 2000).
171. TEx. R. Civ. P. 199.5(e).
172. Id.
173. MD. R. DISCOVERY 9.
174. Id.
175. MICH. R. CIV. PROC. 2.306(D)(3).
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1).
177. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1); ARIz. R. Civ. P. 32(d)(3)(d)-(e); OR. R. Civ. P. 39(d)(3). These provisions
draw largely from the pre-2000 version of the Federal Rule. Neither the Alaska nor the Arizona rule requires the
objecting party to state the grounds for the objection unless requested by the questioning party. MD. R. Civ. P. 2-
415(a). See MD. R. DISCOVERY 8(c). Texas' provisions come from its recent substantial revision to its discovery law.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 199.5(e). Argumentative or suggestive objections or explanations waive any objections. Id. South
Carolina enacted its deposition conduct provisions in 2000. S.C. R. CIv. P. 30(j). These state:
(1) At the beginning of each deposition, deposing counsel shall instruct the witness to ask deposing
counsel, rather than the witness' own counsel, for clarifications, definitions, or explanations of any
words, questions or documents presented during the course of the deposition. The witness shall
abide by these instructions.
(2) All objections, except those which would be waived if not made at the deposition under [another
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rule], and those necessary to assert a privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence directed by the
Court, or to present a motion pursuant to [another rules] shall be preserved.
(3) Counsel shall not direct or request that a witness not answer a question, unless that counsel has
objected to the question on the ground that the answer is protected by a privilege or a limitation
on evidence directed by the court or unless that counsel intends to present a motion under [another
rule]. In addition, counsel shall have an affirmative duty to inform a witness that, unless such an
objection is made, the question must be answered. Counsel directing that a witness not answer a
question on those grounds or allowing a witness to refuse to answer a question on those grounds
shall move the court for a protective order under [another rule] within five business days of the
suspension or termination of the deposition. Failure to timely file such a motion will constitute
waiver of the objection, and the deposition may be reconvened.
(4) Counsel shall not make objections or statements which might suggest an answer to a witness.
Counsel's objections shall be stated concisely and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive
manner, stating the basis of the objection and nothing more.
(5) Counsel and a witness shall not engage in private, off-the-record conferences during depositions
or during breaks or recesses regarding the substance of the testimony at the deposition, except for
the purpose of deciding whether to assert a privilege or to make an objection or to move for a
protective order.
(6) Any conferences which occur pursuant to, or in violation of, section (5) of this rule are proper
subjects for inquiry by deposing counsel to ascertain whether there has been any witness coaching
and, if so, to what extent and nature.
(7) Any conferences which occur pursuant to, or in violation of, section (5) of this rule shall be noted
on the record by the counsel who participated in the conference. The purpose and outcome of the
conference shall be noted on the record.
(8) Deposing counsel shall provide to opposing counsel a copy of all documents shown to the witness
during the deposition, either before the deposition begins or contemporaneously with the showing
of each document to the witness. If the documents are provided (or otherwise identified) at least
two business days before the deposition, then the witness and the witness' counsel do not have the
right to discuss the documents privately before the witness answers questions about them. If the
documents have not been so provided or identified, then counsel and the witness may have a
reasonable amount of time to discuss the documents before the witness answers questions
concerning the document.
(9) Violation of this rule may subject the violator to sanctions under [another rules].
id.
Washington's provisions resemble a simpler version of South Carolina's provisions. WASH. R. Civ. P. 30(h).
These state:
(1) Conduct of Examining Counsel. Examining counsel will refrain from asking questions he or she
knows to be beyond the legitimate scope of discovery, and from undue repetition.
(2) Objections. Only objections which are not reserved for time of trial by these rules or which are
based on privileges or raised to questions seeking information beyond the scope of discovery may
be made during the course of the deposition. All objections shall be concise and must not suggest
or coach answers from the deponent. Argumentative interruptions by counsel shall not be
permitted.
(3) Instructions Not to Answer. Instructions to the deponent not to answer questions are improper,
except when based upon privilege or pursuant to rule 30(d). When a privilege is claimed the
deponent shall nevertheless answer questions related to the existence, extent, or waiver of the
privilege, such as the date of communication, identity of the declarant, and in whose presence the
statement was made.
(4) Responsiveness. Witnesses shall be instructed to answer all questions directly and without evasion
to the extent of their testimonial knowledge, unless properly instructed by counsel not to answer.
(5) Private Consultation. Except where agreed to, attorneys shall not privately confer with deponents
during the deposition between a question and an answer except for the purpose of determining the
existence of privilege. Conferences with attorneys during normal recesses and at adjournment are
permissible unless prohibited by the court.
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as well as Delaware, address off-the-record conferences. Alaska and Arizona
specifically prohibit "continuous and unwarranted off-the-record conferences
between the deponent and counsel following the propounding of questions and prior
to the answer or at any time during the deposition .. 178 Maryland's Discovery
Guidelines make it "presumptively improper" for a deponent's attorney "to initiate
a private conference with a deponent" except to determine whether to assert a
privilege.'79 Guideline 6 then describes the specific information required of any
party who does assert such a privilege. 80 Delaware prohibits any consultations or
conferences between the deponent and counsel during the deposition, including
recesses of up to five days, except to discuss assertions of privilege or compliance
(6) Courtroom Standard. All counsel and parties shall conduct themselves in depositions with the
same courtesy and respect for the rules that are required in the courtroom during trial.
Id.
178. Id.
179. MD. R. DISCOVERY 8(e).
180. Id. 6. The guideline specifies:
Where a claim of privilege is asserted during a deposition and information is not provided on the
basis of such assertion:
(a) The attorney asserting the privilege shall identify during the deposition the nature of the
privilege (including work product) which is being claimed; and
(b) The following information shall be provided during the deposition at the time the privilege
is asserted, if sought, unless divulgence of such information would cause disclosure of the
allegedly privileged information:
(1) For oral communications:
(i) the name of the person making the communication and the names of the persons
present while the communication was made and, where not apparent, the
relationship of the persons present to the person making the communications;
(ii) the date and place of the communication; and
(iii) the general subject matter of the communication.
(2) For documents, to the extent the information is readily obtainable from the witness
being deposed or otherwise;
(i) the type of document, e.g., letter or memorandum;
(ii) the general subject matter of the document;
(iii) the date of the document; and
(iv) such other information as is sufficient to identify the document for a subpoena
duces tecum, including, where appropriate, the author, addressee, and any other
recipient of the document, and where not apparent, the relationship of the author,
addressee, and any other recipient to each other;
(3) Objection on the ground of privilege asserted during a deposition may be amplified by
the objector subsequent to the deposition.
(c) After a claim of privilege has been asserted, the attorney seeking disclosure should have
reasonable latitude during the deposition to question the witness to establish other relevant
information concerning the assertion of privilege, including (i) the applicability of the
particular privilege being asserted, (ii) circumstances which may constitute an exception to
the assertion of the privilege, (iii) circumstances which may result in the privilege having
been waived, and (iv) circumstances which may overcome a claim of qualified privilege.
Id.
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with a court order. 181 Texas also bars conferences except to discuss assertions of
privilege. Unlike Delaware, however, Texas does allow "private conferences ...
during agreed recesses and adjournments."'' 82 Texas also sets out a general "trial
behavior" standard. 1
83
In addition to these specific prohibitions, several courts are moving towards
more detailed listing of appropriate and inappropriate deposition conduct. As noted
already, Maryland has developed a series of guidelines for the conduct of discovery.
Guidelines 8 and 9 address the conduct of depositions. Guideline 9 simply
encourages attorneys who are objecting to the form of a deposition question, "if
requested, to state the reason for the objection., 184 Guideline 8, however, lists a half-
dozen presumptively improper deposition tactics. In addition to the two noted above,
two others are specific enough to give real guidance to counsel on impermissible
conduct. They are: asking questions that misstate or mischaracterize a witness'
previous answer; and insisting "upon an answer to a multiple-part question after
objection.' 185
Closer to home, the federal district court for the Central District of California
has also published "Civility and Professional Guidelines"'' 86 for attorneys who
practice before it. Section four of that document sets out eight guidelines for
deposition practice. Among other matters, attorneys commit: to only take
depositions where actually needed to obtain information or to perpetuate testimony;
not to engage in any conduct during a deposition that would be inappropriate in the
presence of a judge; not to make irrelevant inquiries into a deponent's personal
affairs or question a deponent's integrity; to limit objections to those that are "well-
founded and necessary to protect [the] client's interests" recognizing "that most
objections are preserved and need be interposed only when the form of a question
is defective or privileged information is sought;" and not to coach witnesses through
deposition objections or otherwise. 187
181. DEL. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1). Under this rule:
From the commencement until the conclusion of a deposition, including any recesses or
continuances thereof of less than five calendar days, the attorney(s) for the deponent shall
not: (A) consult or confer with the deponent regarding the substance of the testimony already
given or anticipated to be given, except for the purpose of conferring on whether to assert
a privilege against testifying or on how to comply with a court order, or (B) suggest to the
deponent the manner in which any question should be answered.
Id.
182. TEx. R. Civ. P. 199.5(d).
183. "The oral deposition must be conducted in the same manner as if the testimony were being obtained in
court during trial." Id.
184. MD. R. DISCOVERY 9.
185. Id. 8(a), (b).
186. See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 77, at 11:17.2 (2001) (quoting "Civility and Professionalism
Guidelines" Central District of California, http://www.cacd.uscourt.gov).
187. Id.
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4. Deposition Scheduling
Several states have some deposition scheduling provisions worth noting. Many
states, including California, place a brief "hold" on the initiation of deposition
practice by plaintiffs. During this time, the defendant may notice a deposition, but
the plaintiff may not. Like Indiana, New Hampshire, and Puerto Rico, California
places the hold at twenty days. 188 At least eight states use a longer hold. 89 Two add
to the usual circumstances when judicial permission is needed before a party may
take a deposition. In Massachusetts, a party must obtainjudicial permission if "there
is no reasonable likelihood that recovery will exceed $50,000 if the plaintiff
prevails"' 90 or if "there has been a hearing before a master."' 9 ' In Michigan,
permission is required "only if the plaintiff seeks to take a deposition before the
defendant has had a reasonable time to obtain an attorney."' 192 The statute then
details five circumstances under which a "reasonable time is deemed to have
elapsed."' 193 These include four specific actions to defend the case and a fifth: the
passage of twenty-eight days after service.' 94 A third state, Illinois, specifically
precludes the scheduling of depositions on weekends or holidays, absent stipulation
or judicial order.195 Additionally, jurisdictions with discovery "guidelines" also
include admonitions on deposition scheduling. 96 Finally, in contrast to California
practice, the filing of a motion for a protective order in Colorado, New Mexico, New
York and Wyoming automatically stays the taking of a deposition.
97
5. Depositions By "Remote Electronic Means"
In addition to the attempts to respond to perceived problems with deposition
conduct, other jurisdictions have revised their rules to adapt to new technological
developments. Unlike many state and the federal courts, California has no separate
188. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2025(b) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); IND. R. Civ. P. 30(a); N.H. R. Civ. P. 38
(applies to both plaintiffs and defendants); P.R. R. Civ. P. 27.1.
189. One state, New Jersey, imposes a 35 day hold. N.J. CT. R. 4:14-1. At least 6 states impose a 30 day hold:
MONT. R. Civ. P. 30(a); NEB. R. Civ. P. 30(a); N.M. DIST. CT. R. Civ. P. 1-030(A); N.D. R. Civ. P. 30(a); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, § 3230(A)(2)(a)(2) (2000); R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 30(a). One state-Michigan-imposes a 28 day
hold. MICH. CT. R. 2.306(A)(l)(e). Cf OHIO R. Civ. P. 30(B) (no hold at all).
190. MASS. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(ii).
191. Id. 30(a)(iv).
192. MICH. CT. R. 2.306(a)(1).
193. id.
194. Id. The four specified actions are: a) the filing of an answer; b) the filing of an appearance; c) the
defendant's formal action seeking discovery; and d) the filing of certain motions. Id.
195. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 72(b).
196. For example, Maryland's Guideline 7 urges counsel to clear deposition dates with opposing counsel and
clients ahead of time, and makes any agreed to schedule presumptively binding, requiring a new agreement in order
to be changed. MD. R. DISCOVERY 7(c).
197. COLO. R. Civ. P. 121, 1-12; N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-030(G)(3) (if filed within 3 days of deposition, deponent
excused from attendance at deposition); N.Y.C. P. L.R. 3103; Wyo. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(4).
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provision on depositions by telephone or other "remote electronic means." Although
a telephonic or teleconference deposition would be permissible under California
rules by stipulation of counsel, there is no express provision giving any party a right
to attend or take such a deposition. Similarly, while a court has considerable
authority to fashion protective orders, there is no express statutory authority for a
court to order that a deposition be taken by telephone. In addition, there is no
express direction given on such practical questions as the location of the deposition
or the required presence of the deposition officer.
The federal courts have resolved any uncertainties by expressly authorizing the
taking of depositions via "telephone or other remote electronic means."' 98 Under the
federal rules, such a deposition is permissible either by stipulation or by court order.
For purposes of determining who is an appropriate deposition officer or for filing
motions to compel further testimony, a telephonic deposition is "taken in the district
and at the place where the deponent is to answer questions."'' 99
Over a dozen states have provisions addressing telephonic depositions.2" Most
of these allow the practice either by stipulation or court order. Maryland only allows
them by stipulation. Florida only allows them by court order. Several go beyond the
rather terse provisions of their federal counterpart and add useful additional material.
For example, Colorado and Texas specify that the officer who swears the deponent
need not be the person who records the testimony. This would allow the provision
of separate swearing and recording "officers" in separate locations.20 ' Texas also
allows the parties to be at the place where the witness will answer the questions,
even if the party noticing the deposition will not be there. 2 Iowa specifies that the
deposing party must pay all costs incurred that are attributable to the telephonic
format. It also prohibits the subsequent taxation of these costs. In addition, Iowa
specifically requires the deposing party to send copies of any exhibits that will be
discussed in the deposition to other parties before the deposition.
The most extensive additional provisions are found in Nevada, Illinois and
Virginia. To the basic federal formula, Nevada Rule 30(b)(7) adds:
Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties: (A) the party taking the
deposition shall arrange for the presence of the officer before whom the
198. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7).
199. Id. Cf OR. R. Civ. P. 38(A)(2) (deposition taken in Oregon if either the deponent or the person
administering the oath is in Oregon) 39(c)(7) (oath may be administered telephonically); TEX. R. Civ. P. 199.1 (b)
(electronic deposition taken under Texas law is taken at the place where the witness is located).
200. COLO. R. CIV. P. 30(b) and 30(f)( I); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.3 10(b)(7); GA. CODEANN. § 9-11-30(b)(4) (2000);
HAW. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 206(h); IowA R. Civ. P. 140(g); MD. CIRC. CT. R. Civ. P. 2-417; Miss.
R. Civ. P. 30(b)(I)(7); NEV. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7); N.M. DIST. CT. R. Civ. P. 1-030(B)(7); N.D. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7);
OR. R. Civ. P. 38, 39; S.C. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7); TEX. R. Civ. P. 199.1; TENN. R. Civ. P. 30.02(7).
201. Texas specifies that the "officer" may be at the noticing party's location, not the deponent's location,
provided that the witness is placed under oath by someone present with the deponent and authorized to administer
oaths in the jurisdiction of the deponent's location. TEX. R. Civ. P. 199.
202. Id. 199.
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deposition will take place; (B) the officer shall be physically present at the
place of the deposition [i.e., where the deponent is physically located]; (C)
the party taking the deposition shall make the necessary telephone
connections at the time scheduled for the deposition. Nothing in this
paragraph shall prevent a party from being physically present at the place
of the deposition, at the party's own expense. °3
Similarly, Illinois' recently enacted provision adds to the basic provisions:
Except as otherwise provided [in this paragraph], the rules governing the
practice, procedures and use of depositions shall apply to remote electronic
means depositions.
(1) The deponent shall be in the presence of the officer
administering the oath and recording the deposition, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties.
(2) Any exhibits or other demonstrative evidence to be presented
to the deponent by any party at the deposition shall be provided
to the officer administering the oath and all other parties within
a reasonable period of time prior to the deposition.
(3) Nothing in this paragraph ... shall prohibit any party from
being within the deponent during the deposition, at that party's
expense; provided, however, that a party attending a deposition
shall give written notice of that party's intention to appear at
the deposition to all other parties within a reasonable time prior
to the deposition.
(4) The party at whose instance the remote electronic means
deposition is taken shall pay all costs of the remote electronic
means deposition, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.2"
Finally, Virginia rolls its provision regarding "remote electronic means" into a
general provision regarding "audio-visual means. 20 5 It expressly includes, without
limitation, "videoconferencing and teleconferencing" within those means.
2 6
6. Audio and Video Recording of Depositions
Section 2025(1) of the California Code of Civil Procedure extensively addresses
the audio or video recording of depositions. Many states now have comparable
provisions. Several points from these other statutes and rules are worth noting for
203. NEV. R. CIv. P. 30(b)(7).
204. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 206(h) (2001).
205. VA. SUP. CT. R. Civ. P. 4:7A(a).
206. Id.
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possible adoption in California. At least eight states dispense with the requirement
that, absent agreement or an order to the contrary, an electronically recorded
deposition also be stenographically recorded.0 7 In such cases, for example, where
there is no simultaneous stenographic transcript made, Virginia expressly eliminates
the requirement that the transcript be submitted to the deponent for correction and
208signing.
Almost the same number of states also expressly specify that electronically
recorded deposition costs may be taxed.209
Five states require that a digital clock or other electronic timer appear in the
screen at all times.2 10
Ten states have provisions governing procedures for objecting to videotaped
testimony, for editing tapes in response to rulings on objections, and for resolving
discrepancies between the electronic recording and any stenographic transcription.2 1
Six states have provisions regarding the focus of the camera's attention. Alaska
Rule 30.1 requires that the deponent be videotaped seated at a table and shot only
from the waist up.212 Kentucky Rule 30.02 requires that the videotape operator
receive a copy of Rule 30.02.213 At the election of the noticing party, at the
beginning of the taping, the operator must either focus on, and identify, each
attorney, party and witness present, or may read a statement introducing the parties
207. ARK. R. Civ. P. 32(c); KY. R. Civ. P. 30.02(4)(c); ME. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4)(F) ("The method of recording
specified in the notice by the party noticing the deposition shall constitute the only official record of the
deposition"). MONT. R. Civ. P. 30(h)(l)(a); N.D. R. Civ. P. 30.1(a)(1); R.I. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(2) & (3); TENN. R. Civ.
P. 30.02(4)(b); VA. SUP. CT. R. Civ. P. 4:7A(D)(1).
208. Id. 4:7A(b).
209. ALASKA R. CIv. P. 30. 1(e); MASS. R. Civ. P. 30(A); MICH. CT. R. 2.315(I); MONT. R. Civ. P. 30(h)(5);
N.D. R. Civ. P. 30. 1(e); TENN. R. Civ. P. 30.02(4)(b). Cf. WASH. R. SUP. CT. Civ. P. 30(b)(8)(D) (absent stipulation,
costs of videotaping may not be taxed).
210. MASS. R. Civ. P. 30A(c)(6); MICH. CT. R. 2.315(c)(2); MONT. R. Civ. P. 30(h)(4)(f); N.D. R. Civ. P.
30.1 (d)(6); TENN. R. Civ. P. 30.02(4)(B)(VI). See also ALASKA R. Civ. P. 30.1 (d)(7) & (8) (requiring written counter
log; permitting use of on-screen digital timer).
211. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 30.1 (d)( 11) (original must be preserved if editing order issued); Ky. R. Civ. P.
30.02(4)(d)(c) & (e); ME. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4) (all recording methods must "permit editing for use at trial in a manner
that will allow the expeditious removal of objectionable and extraneous material without significant disruption in
presentation of the edited testimony to a jury"); MASS. R. Civ. P. 30A(g) & (j); MONT. R. CiV. P. 30(h)(4)(i) (like
Alaska); N.D. R. Civ. P. 30.1 (d)(8) (must preserve original if court issues editing order); S.C. R. Civ. P. 30(h)(8)-(9)
(extensive provisions); TENN. R. Civ. P. 30.02(4)(b)(vii) & (ix); VA. SUP. CT. R. Civ. P. A(b)(3) (no editing
permitted without a court order); WASH. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(8)(G).
212. ALASKAR. Civ. P. 30.1.
213. Ky. R. Civ. P. 30.02(4)(a). South Carolina requires that the equipment operator certify that he or she is
familiar with the requirements of South Carolina's provisions on audio-visual deposition recording. S.C. R. Civ.
P. 30(h)(13).
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214
and attorneys present. To prevent "unfair or undue influence upon the words of
the witness," the camera must
remain stationary at all times during the deposition and will not "zoom" in
or out on the witness excepting those times during the deposition when the
witness is displaying, for the jury's viewing, exhibits or other pieces of
demonstrative proof that can only be fairly and reasonably seen on the
videotape by use of the camera "zooming" in on said evidence.215
South Carolina, too, bans any close-ups taken without agreement, other than for
exhibits.21 6 Maine sets out seven criteria applicable to any deposition recording
method, whether stenographic, electronic, or otherwise. Among other matters, all
recording methods must "provide clear identification of the separate speakers. 217
Similar to Alaska and Kentucky, the rule provides that in videotaped depositions,
unless otherwise agreed, "the camera shall focus solely on the witness and any
exhibits utilized by the witness ... ,,2 8 Like Kentucky, Alaska, South Carolina, and
Maine, Massachusetts has express provisions requiring the camera operator to
maintain a constant view of the deponent, except when asked to zoom in to display
a relevant exhibit or visual aid.219 Michigan specifically approves the use of more
than one camera "in sequence or simultaneously.
220
Finally, there are a handful of additional matters that are worth noting. For
example, in addition to expressly qualifying the admissibility of the tape on the
absence of distorting technical errors, Kentucky permits objections that "the general
technical quality of the tape is so poor that its being viewed by the jury would be
unfairly prejudicial to the side so objecting. ' 221 Louisiana makes unnecessary the
222
reading or signing of a taped deposition. In extensive provisions that go far
beyond section 2025(u)(4) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, Massachusetts
details the circumstances governing the oral depositions of treating physicians or
expert witnesses by parties who intend to use such depositions in lieu of trial
testimony223 New Hampshire's rules provide three simple admonitions to counsel
at a videotaped deposition. First, they must take care "to have the witnesses speak
slowly and distinctly., 224 Second, they must have papers "readily available for
214. KY. R. Civ. P. 30.02(4)(a).
215. Id. 30.02(b).
216. S.C. R. CIV. P. 30(h)(2)(D).
217. ME. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4)(c).
218. Id. 30(b)(4)(F)
219. MA. R. Civ. P. 30A(d).
220. Id. 30A(C)(5).
221. Ky. R. Civ. P. 30.02(f).
222. LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 1445 (West 2001).
223. MA. R. Civ. P. 30A(m).
224. N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 45.
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reference without undue delay and unnecessary noise. 225 Third, both counsel and
witnesses must "comport themselves at all times as if they were actually in the
courtroom. 226
South Carolina requires the party who wishes to playback testimony at trial to
provide the proper playback equipment . 7 South Carolina also has the most
extensive provisions regarding the allocation of the costs of recording. It states:
The cost of videotape, as a material, shall be borne by the party taking the
videotape deposition. Where an edited version is required, the cost of
videotape, as a material, shall be borne by the party who caused to be
recorded testimony or other evidence subsequently determined to be
objectionable and ordered stricken from the tape by the court. The cost of
recording the deposition testimony on videotape shall be borne by the party
taking videotape deposition. The cost of producing an edited version of the
videotape recording for use at trial shall be borne by the party who caused
to be recorded testimony or other evidence subsequently determined to be
objectionable and ordered stricken from the tape by the court.22 8
For depositions recorded nonstenographically, Vermont allows an attorney to
swear the deponent, provided the attorney is a notary.229
7. Miscellaneous Deposition Provisions
Finally, a handful of specific, unrelated provisions collectively deserve mention
as possible sources of changes to California deposition law. Many states have
provisions regarding appropriate deposition officers that differ markedly from
California's general provision. In California, a deposition must simply be supervised
by an officer "who is authorized to administer an oath., 230 This is often a notary
public. 3 ' Further, California disqualifies anyone "financially interested in the
action" and "a relative or employee of any attorney of any of the parties[,] or of any
of the parties.
2 32
In contrast, other states specifically enumerate certain individuals who can
preside over a deposition. Two states address depositions of members of the armed
forces of the United States. Idaho allows any military officer to preside over the
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. S.C. R. Civ. P. 30(h)(10).
228. Id. 30(h)(ii).
229. VT. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4)(A).
230. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2025(k) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001). Additional provisions address the
appropriate officers for depositions taken in other U.S. jurisdictions or nations. id. §§ 2026(c), 2027(c).
231. HOGAN & WEBER, supra note 4 l, at § 2.21.
232. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2025(k)(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
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deposition of both a member of the military and the family of such members. 33
Similarly, Iowa allows the taking of a deposition of members of the armed forces
before their commissioned officer or any judge advocate general's officer.3
Kentucky and Missouri add city mayors to the list of approved deposition officers.235
In addition, several states have different approaches to the list of individuals
presumptively disqualified from serving as deposition officers. Louisiana precludes
the use of any court reporter with whom a party has a contract to provide reporting
services.236 North Carolina echoes this provision, precluding the use, absent
agreement, of any individual or firm that "is under a blanket contract for the court
reporting services with an attorney of the parties, party to the action, or party having
a financial interest in the action. 237 In addition, it disqualifies anyone from serving
as a deposition officer who is "under any contractual agreement that requires
transmission of the original transcript [before it has been] certified. 238 South Dakota
also has a provision disqualifying persons working under certain standing contracts
for court reporting services from serving as deposition officers. 23 9 New Hampshire
requires the deposition notice to include the name of the deposition officer.24° Puerto
Rico, New York and Tennessee define disqualified "relatives" more specifically
than California, by reference to "degrees of consanguinity.'2 41 Puerto Rico also
excuses deposition officers from staying in attendance after the deponent has been
sworn.
2 4 2
Several states chart a different path regarding changes in the deposition
transcript. For thirty days after the taking of a deposition, California allows the
deponent to "change the form or substance of the answer to a question .... ,43
233. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 28(c).
234. IowA R. Civ. P. 153(d).
235. KY. R. Civ. P. 28.02; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 492.090(2). Missouri also allows the taking of a deposition by
anyone having a seal or the chief officer of a town. Id.
236. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1434A(2) (West 2001).
237. N.C. R. Civ. P. 28(c)(4). The rule further defines "a blanket contract" as "a contract to perform court
reporting services over a fixed period of time or an indefinite period of time, rather than on a case-by-case basis,
or any other contractual agreement which compels the, guarantees, regulates, or controls the use of particular court
reporting services in future cases." Id.
238. Id.
239. S.D. Codified Laws § 15-16-28(c) (Michie 2000). It defines "employee of [an] attorney or counsel" to
include "a person who has a contractual relationship with a person or entity interested in the outcome of the
litigation, including anyone who may ultimately be responsible for payment to provide reporting or other court
services, and a person who is employed part-time or full-time under contract or otherwise by a person who has a
contractual relationship with a party to provide reporting or other court services." Id. It excludes "[c]ontracts for
court reporting services for federal, state, or local governments and subdivisions . I..." Id  It expressly does not
prohibit "[n]egotiating or bidding reasonable fees, equal to all parties, on a case-by-case basis . I... Id.
240. N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 39.
241. P.R. R. Civ. P. 25.3 (4th degree of consanguinity); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3113 (McKinney 2001) (disqualified
if would be disqualified to act as a juror because of consanguinity to a party); TENN. R. Civ. P. 28.03 (6th degree
of consanguinity (civil)).
242. P.R. R. Civ. P. 25.1.
243. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2025(q)(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
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Similar provisions apply in courts that follow the federal rules.244 In contrast, Illinois
only allows corrections for "errors. 245 Even more stringently, New Hampshire, New
Mexico and North Dakota prohibit any changes or alterations, but allow the
deponent to set forth alleged errors in a separate document.246 New York refuses to
permit claims of transcription errors unless a motion to suppress is made with
reasonable promptness.247
Unlike California, Arkansas has eliminated the requirement that the deposition
record be formally "sealed." In Arkansas, a deposition need merely be "secured. 2 48
North Dakota allows a deposition officer to use a traceable commercial service to
send a deposition transcript.249 Similarly, Ohio expressly authorizes transfer by
express mail.25°
Section 2025(u) of the California Code of Civil Procedure does contain
extensive provisions regarding the use of deposition testimony at trial. Nevertheless,
several provisions from other states are worth noting. Colorado encourages the
parties to use summaries of testimony rather than reading verbatim from the
transcript at trial.25' Georgia requires the use of nonstenographic deposition
recordings at trial, other than for cross-examination, if they exist.25 2 Idaho clarifies
that a party wishing to introduce a deposition transcript at trial or in support of a
motion need not produce the original unless there is a genuine question about its
authenticity.253 Ohio requires that any deposition that will be used at trial be filed at
least one day before the start of trial.254 Kentucky provides an extensive list of
persons whose deposition may be introduced at trial without a showing of their
unavailability. The list includes state constitutional officers, postmasters, bank
officers or clerks, doctors, lawyers, prison guards, and members of the armed
forces. 255 Finally, Michigan has an express "harmless error" provision regarding the
admissibility of deposition provisions. Errors in the taking of depositions, even if
not waived, will not restrict the usefulness at trial of the deposition unless the court
finds that the deposition has been destroyed or that its use is unfair. 6
Rhode Island and Texas have addressed attendance at depositions. Rhode Island
prohibits anyone from being excluded from a deposition without a prior court order
244. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 30(e). These courts require the deponent to state the reasons for any such changes.
Id.
245. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 207(a).
246. N.H. SUPER CT. R. 41; N.M. DIST. CT. R. Civ. P. 30(e); N.D. R. Civ. P. 30(e).
247. N.Y C.P.L.R. 3116.
248. ARK. R. Civ. P. 30(f)(1).
249. N.D. R. Civ. P. 30(f)(1).
250. OHIO R. Civ. P. 30(F)(1).
251. COLO. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(5).
252. GA. R. Civ. P. 30(g). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-232(c) (2000).
253. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 30(f)(4)(B).
254. OHIO R. Civ. P. 30(A).
255. KY. R. CIV. P. 32.01(c).
256. MICH. CT. R. 2.308(C)(5).
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and requires forty-eight hours notice to all parties if persons, other than parties or
party representatives, will be attending a deposition." 7 Texas, too, requires notice
if someone other than the witness, parties, spouses of parties, counsel, counsel's
258
employees or the deposition officer plans to be present at the deposition.
New York has given organizational deponents an option not available in
California and other jurisdictions. In many jurisdictions, as in California,. a party
seeking to depose an organization has two options. First, it can describe the subject
matter about which the deposing party wishes to examine the organization, and
allow the organization to choose the appropriate person to be deposed on its behalf.
Second, as for any individual, it can simply "name" an individual representative in
the deposition notice or subpoena, and depose that individual accordingly. 259 In
contrast, under New York law, an organization that has been asked to produce a
specific officer, director, member or employee for deposition can give ten days
notice that it plans to produce someone else to be deposed on the matter.26°
The substantial costs of taking depositions has prompted several jurisdictions
to develop specific provisions addressing the payment, allocation and award of
deposition expenses as costs. Louisiana requires the parties to state on the record
which of them will be paying for the costs. 26' Iowa requires the deposing party to
pay the costs of any depositions taken and prohibits the use of deposition testimony
at trial until such costs have been paid.2 62 In addition, Iowa only allows the court to
tax as costs those portions of the depositions that were necessarily incurred for
testimony admitted at trial.263 Michigan and North Dakota allow the court to
apportion the transcription costs for nonstenographic depositions. 64 Maine adds to
the illustrative list of protective orders both a provision apportioning the costs of
travel to a deposition as well as one that requires a witness under the control of a
party to be brought into the state for deposition.265
Illinois has the most extensive provisions on deposition costs. Under the Illinois
provision: (1) the party taking the deposition pays the fees for the witness, the
officer, and the recorder; (2) the party at whose instance the deposition is transcribed
pays the transcription costs; (3) if the scope of examination by any party exceeds the
scope of the party at whose instance the deposition was taken, the court will
apportion the excess to the additional party.
266
257. R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 30(c).
258. TEX. R. Civ. P. 199.5(a)(3).
259. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 2025(d)(6) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
260. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3106.
261. LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 1446(B)(4) (West 2001).
262. IOWA R. Civ. P. 157.
263. Id.
264. MICH. CT. R. 2.306(C)(3)(c) (if transcript used at trial); N.D. R. Civ. P. 30(c) (any transcript).
265. ME. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(10).
266. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 208(a).
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Oklahoma places all of the burden of deposition costs, including the preparation
of transcripts or copies of videotapes for adverse parties, on the noticing party. All
of these costs, however, can ultimately be taxed.267
Finally, four states have provisions addressing attendance at written depositions.
California, however, has no provisions addressing the physical attendance of parties
or their attorneys at the site where the deposition officer will be propounding the
written questions. Alabama and Iowa expressly allow any party to give notice that
it intends to show up in person and cross-examine the deponent. Upon receipt of
such notice, the examining party may choose to show up as well. 68 In contrast,
Kentucky expressly precludes any party or party's attorney from attending written
depositions in person.269
B. Interrogatory Practice
Unlike the extensive provisions governing deposition practice, fewer potential
innovations can be found in the survey of provisions governing interrogatories.
Nevertheless, the important differences between California and other state and
federal courts regarding the presumptive numbers of interrogatories that may be
asked provide an opportunity for California to reexamine its limits. In addition, there
are a handful of miscellaneous provisions worth noting.
1. Presumptive Numerical Limits
California allows any party to send any other party an unlimited number of
"form" interrogatories and thirty-five "specially prepared" interrogatories.27° A party
wishing to send more than the thirty-five "specially prepared" interrogatories need
only attach a "declaration for additional discovery."'271 In such a declaration, the
party must simply state that the complexity or quantity of issues in the case, or the
expenses of obtaining the information through alternative means, justifies the
additional discovery.272 The burden is on the recipient to challenge the sufficiency
of the affidavit, although the burden remains on the propounding party to justify the
number.273
At the time of its enactment, section 2030(c) of the California Code of Civil
Procedure was on the leading edge of attempts to rein in abusive interrogatory
practice. Nearly fifteen years later, however, the provision is easily the weakest of
267. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 3230(J) (2000).
268. ALA. R. CIv. P. 3 1(a); IOwA R. Civ. P. 150(c).
269. Ky. R. Civ. P. 31.02.
270. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2030(c)(l)-(2) (West 1998). In addition, a party may send supplemental
interrogatories up to three more times which do not count against the 35 special interrogatory limit. Id. § 2030(c)(8).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. § 2030(c)(2)(C).
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the efforts to end interrogatory abuse. It finds closest company with the likes of
Georgia, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire and South Carolina. Each
of these five states allow a total of fifty interrogatories. 274 At the tougher extreme lie
the federal courts and two companion states. Since 1993, the federal courts have
limited interrogatories to twenty-five total. A party who wishes to exceed that
number must obtain permission from either opposing counsel or the court.275 Eleven
other states are only slightly more generous: Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Virginia and
Wyoming allow a total of thirty interrogatories without a stipulation or court
order.276 Florida and Colorado include official form interrogatories in their limits,
although Colorado excludes subparts of official form interrogatories from being
considered separate interrogatories for purposes of its limit. 277 Florida, however,
requires the use of official form interrogatories if they have been developed for the
type of action involved.278 Kentucky has a similar limit of thirty, but excludes
interrogatories seeking names and addresses of witnesses from its count.279 Next lies
Louisiana, with a limit of thirty-five. 8 ° One tick higher are Arizona, the District of
Columbia, Idaho and Nevada, each of which permit forty interrogatories. 28' Arizona
includes official form interrogatories in this limit, although, like Colorado, does not
count individual subparts of such interrogatories as separate items.282 Finally, two
states place extremely tight restrictions in certain kinds of cases. In certain personal
injury cases in Connecticut, only official form interrogatories are permitted absent
stipulation or court order.283 Similarly, in New Jersey, for specified types of cases
with official form interrogatories, only ten specially prepared interrogatories may
be used.284 Both of these last two jurisdictions allow a simple demand for answers
274. MINN. R. Civ. P. 33.01(a); MONT. R. Civ. P. 33(a); NEB. R. DISCOVERY 33(a); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 36;
S.C. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(8) South Carolina also allows seven official form interrogatories without counting towards
the fifty interrogatory limit. Id.
275. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a).
276. COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213(c); IOWA R. Civ. P. 126(a); ME.
R. Civ. P. 33(a); MASS. R. Civ. P. 33(a); Miss. R. Civ. P. 33(a); OKLA. STAT. tit.12, § 3233(A) (2000); R.I. SUPER.
CT. R. Civ. P. 33(b); VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:8(g); WYo. R. Civ. P. 33(a).
277. COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a).
278. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.340(a).
279. Ky. R. Civ. P. 33.01(3).
280. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1457(B) (West 2000).
281. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 33.1 (a); D.C. R. Civ. Proc. 33(a); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 33(a)(3); NEV. R. Civ. P. 33(d).
282. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 33.1(a).
283. CONN. R. SUPER. CT. CIv. 13-6(c) The specified classes ofcases are: "all personal injury actions alleging
liability based on the operation or ownership of a motor vehicle or alleging liability based on the ownership,
maintenance or control of real property. ... "Id.
284. N.J. R. SUPER. CT. Civ. 4:17-1(b)(1). The specified classes of cases are: "all actions seeking recovery
for property damage to automobiles and in all personal injury cases other than wrongful death, toxic torts, cases
involving issues of professional malpractice other than medical malpractice, and those products liability cases either
involving pharmaceuticals or giving rise to a toxic tort claim . I..." Id.
Cf. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26.2(b) (limiting parties, in medical malpractice actions, to ten "non-uniform"
interrogatories).
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to the form interrogatories in lieu of formal service of copies of the interrogatories
themselves.28
5
2. Other Potential Innovations
Beyond the provisions addressing the presumptive numerical limits, the
jurisdictional survey produced only a handful of additional areas for possible
innovation. New Jersey requires a responding party who is not answering from
personal knowledge to indicate where it got the information from.286 It also allows
service of a single copy of answers on parties represented by the same attorney.287
New Jersey also expressly requires a responding party to answer all form
interrogatories unless they call for privileged information.288 North Dakota excuses
responding parties from answering "an interrogatory that is repetitive of any
interrogatory it has already answered. 289 Illinois sets out a general requirement that
propounders of interrogatories "restrict them to the subject matter of the particular
case, to avoid undue detail, and to avoid the imposition of any unnecessary burden
or expense on the answering party." 290 It also allows a responding party to make its
business records available in lieu of answering interrogatories without regard to the
relative burdens on the parties of combing through the records.29' Maryland's
Discovery Guidelines detail requirements for making objections.292 In specified
285. CONN. R. SUPER. CT. CIV. 13-6(c) (sufficient to send "notice" referring to individual official form
interrogatories by number); N.J. R. SUPER. CT. Civ. 4:17-1 (b)(2).
286. N.J. R. SUPER. CT. Civ. 4:18-4.
287. Id.
288. Id. 4:17-1(b)(3).
289. N.D. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(7).
290. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213(b).
291. Id. 213(d).
292. MD. R. DISCOVERY 5. The guideline states:
(a) No part of an interrogatory should be left unanswered merely because an objection is
interposed to another part of an interrogatory.
(b) The practice of objecting to an interrogatory or a part thereof while simultaneously providing
partial or incomplete answer to the objectionable part is presumptively improper.
(c) Where a claim of privilege is asserted in objecting to any interrogatory or part thereof and
information is not provided on the basis of such assertion: (1) The party asserting the
privilege shall be in the objection to the interrogatory or part thereof and information is not
provided on the basis of such assertion: (2) The following information shall be provided in
the objection, unless divulgence of such information would cause disclosure of the allegedly
privileged information: (i) For oral communications: (a) the name of the person making the
communication and the names of persons present while the communication was made, where
not apparent the relationship of the persons present to the person making communication:
(b) the date and place of the communication and (c) the general subject matter of the
communication. (ii) For documents: (a) the type of documents; (b) general subject matter of
the document; (c) the date of the document; and (d) such other information as is sufficient
to identify the document for a subpoena duces tecum, including, where appropriate, the
author, addressee, and any other recipient of the document, and where not apparent, the
relationship of the author, addressee, and any other recipient to each other. (3) The party
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cases, New York bars simultaneous interrogatory and deposition discovery from the
same party.293 Finally, Florida expressly clarifies that interrogatory answers do not
bind coparties.9
C. Inspection Demands
The multi-jurisdictional survey developed only a handful of possible inspection
demand innovations. Neither California nor the federal courts currently place any
presumptive numerical limits on inspection demands. Three states, however, do
place such limits. Arizona allows only ten demands.295 Colorado doubles the
presumptive limit to twenty.296 Connecticut has no general limits, but, as it does for
interrogatories, in specified classes of cases, it restricts inspection demands to
official form demands.297
Three states have potentially useful provisions addressing the service of
inspection demands upon nonparties. In such cases, California authorizes a "records-
only" deposition subpoena.298 Under the Michigan procedure, a demand can be
served without the need of a subpoena.2 99 In addition, Michigan, like New York, 3°°
expressly provides for the court to order that the demanding party pay the costs of
compliance with the demand by the responding party.3 ' Under the Indiana
procedure, a subpoena must be served on the nonparty. °2 But Indiana adds two
wrinkles to the procedure. First, like Pennsylvania, it requires service of the intended
nonparty demand on all parties fifteen days before service on the nonparty.
0 3
Second, it requires the demand to state that the nonparty "is entitled to security
seeking disclosure of the information withheld may, for the purpose of determining whether
to move to compel disclosure, notice the depositions of appropriate witnesses for the limited
purpose of establishing other relevant information concerning the assertion of privilege
including (i) the applicability of the privilege asserted, (ii) circumstances which may
constitute an exception to assertion of the privilege, (iii) circumstances which may result in
the privilege having been waived, and (iv) circumstances which may overcome a claim of
qualified privilege. The party seeking disclosure may apply to the court for leave to file
special interrogatories or redepose a particular witness if necessary.
293. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3130 (Consol. 2001).
294. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.340(d).
295. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
296. COLO. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2).
297. CONN. R. SUPER. CT. (Civil) § 13-9. The specified cases include: "all personal injury actions alleging
liability based on the operation or ownership of a motor vehicle or alleging liability based on the ownership,
maintenance or control of real property."
298. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2025(c) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
299. MICH. R. Civ. P. 2.310(D). The demand, however, must be served in the same manner as a subpoena
would be served. See MICH. R. Civ. P. 2310(d)(2) (stating that the request must be served on the person to whom
it is directed, and a copy must be served on the other parties).
300. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3111 (Consol. 2001).
301. MICH. R. Civ. P. 2.310(D)(5).
302. IND. R. Civ. P. 34(c).
303. Id.; PA. R. Civ. P. 4009.21.
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against damages or payment of damages resulting from such request. ' 4 If the
nonparty moves to quash service of the demand, the court may condition relief "on
the prepayment of damages . . . or require an adequate surety bond or other
indemnity conditioned against such damages."3 °5
California and the federal courts allow a responding party to produce the
demanded materials either as kept in the ordinary course of business or in separate
categories that respond to the categories of the demand.0 6 Arkansas, however, only
allows a responding party to produce documents "as kept in the ordinary course of
business" if it is just as easy for the demanding party to find the responsive materials
as it is for the responding party. 30 7
Indiana makes an express exception to the best evidence rule for documents that
are not produced in response to inspection demands. 308 Under this exception, a party
who has a document in its possession, custody or control, but failed to produce it in
response to a proper inspection demand, may not raise the "best evidence rule" at
trial. 30
Texas, Nevada and Illinois address the costs of producing documents. Texas
codifies the traditional but rarely-codified rule that the responding party pays for the
costs of finding the materials demanded, while the demanding party pays for the
costs of inspecting, copying or testing the materials produced.310 Nevada expressly
requires the party who wants copying to pay for it. It authorizes the court, however,
to require the responding party to actually do the copying. 311 Similarly, for "records
only" subpoenas, Illinois clarifies that the requesting party, not the "deponent," pays
for any copying charges. 312
New Jersey has an interesting provision addressing documents referenced in
pleadings. If such documents are neither annexed to the pleading nor quoted
verbatim within the pleading, the opposing party has the right to demand a copy of
the documents. The pleader must turn over a copy of the referenced materials within
five days of the demand.31 3
Pennsylvania offers parties faced with ambiguous requests two options. They
can either produce what they believe the request is seeking, or they can identify the
304. IND. R. Civ. P. 34(c).
305. Id.
306. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2031 (f) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
307. ARK. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(3)(B).
308. IND. R. Civ. P. 34(d).
309. Id.
310. TEX. R. Civ. P. 196.6. Cf, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2031(g)(1) (West 1998 & Supp. 2001) (demanding
party pays for costs of translating databases into a useable format); OKLA. STAT., tit. 12, § 3237(c) (requesting party
pays the reasonable expense of making property available for inspection; court may tax costs later).
311. NEV. R. Civ. P. 34(d).
312. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 204(a).
313. N.J. CT. R. 4:18-2.
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documents that they are not producing and present the reasons why they are not
producing them.314
Tennessee requires that a party seeking to do destructive testing on an item must
move for a court order before conducting those tests.3 15
Finally, Texas makes responses to inspection demands self-authenticating,
unless a genuine question exists as to a document's authenticity. 316 Texas also
requires the requesting party to specify the form in which it wants electronic
materials produced.1 7
D. Medical Examinations
Pertaining to medical examinations, only four potential innovations were found.
The first addresses examinations by stipulation. Section 2032(c) of the California
Code of Civil Procedure sets out the procedure for taking a routine physical
examination of a plaintiff in a personal injury case. Section 2032(d) addresses all
other medical examinations. Section 2032(e) then authorizes parties to make their
own agreement regarding medical examinations "in lieu of the procedures and
restrictions specified [in the other two sections] .... ,'1 The line between these
three categories of examinations, however, is unclear when an agreement covers
only some portions of an examination. In contrast, the federal rules specify that the
basic examination provisions control "except to the extent that agreement provides
otherwise. '319 Arizona addresses the circumstances where the parties agree that an
examination is necessary but cannot agree on the identity of the examining physician
or psychologist. In such cases, the examination may be conducted, after notice, by
the physician specified by the party seeking the examination without the prior need
for a judicial order.320 The party unhappy with the selected physician may go to
court to obtain an order changing the identity of the examiner.32'
The second innovation addresses ex parte contacts with physicians. The
California discovery statutes are silent regarding ex parte contacts between a party
and another party's physician. Arkansas and Pennsylvania, however, expressly
314. PA. R. Civ. P. 4009.12(d).
315. TENN. R. CIV. P. 34.01.
316. TEx. R. Civ. P. 193.7.
317. Id. 196.4.
318. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2032(e) (West 1998).
319. FED. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(3).
320. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 35(c)(1).
321. Id. 35(c)(2).
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prohibit any such ex parte contacts absent the party's consent. 22 Arkansas' rules
state:
Any informal, ex parte contact or communication between a party or his or
her attorney and the physician or psychotherapist of any other party is
prohibited, unless the party treated, diagnosed, or examined by the
physician or psychotherapist expressly consents. A party shall not be
required, by order of court or otherwise, to authorize any communication
with his or her physician or psychotherapist other than (A) the furnishing
of medical records, and (B) communications in the context of formal
discovery procedures.323
The third medical exam innovation comes from South Carolina. It instructs the
court that in setting the conditions for any court-ordered exam, it should give special
consideration to the examinee's needs and the examinee's physician's needs, but
only reasonable consideration to the examining physician's needs.324
Finally, Texas clarifies that the party whose condition is in controversy may not
325comment at trial on the adverse party's failure to request a discovery examination.
E. Admission Requests
Two potential admission request innovations were found. The first involves
presumptive numerical limits. As with specially prepared interrogatories, absent
agreement or an order to the contrary, California currently limits admission requests
to thirty-five. Requests for admission of the genuineness of documents do not count
towards this limit.326 Again, like interrogatory practice, to exceed the limit, an
attorney in a California action need only attach a "declaration for additional
discovery., 32 7 Most otherjurisdictions, including the federal courts, do not place any
presumptive limits on admission requests.328 Compared to seven other states who do
impose such limits, however, California's limitations are the second weakest.
Colorado and South Carolina are the toughest, limiting admission requests to
twenty.329 Arizona, with twenty-five, and Iowa, Oklahoma and Oregon, with thirty,
follow. 330 Only Nevada has a more generous presumptive limit, allowing forty
322. ARK. R. Civ. P. 35(c)(2); PA. R. Civ. P. 4003.6.
323. ARK. R. Civ. P. 35(c)(2).
324. S.C. R. Civ. P. 35(a).
325. TEX. R. Civ. P. 204.3.
326. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2033(c)(1) (West 1998).
327. Id. § 2033(c)(2)(3) (West 1998).
328. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
329. COLO. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); S.C. R. Civ. P. 36(c) (stating requests involving authenticity of documents
do not count toward this limit).
330. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26(b); IOwA R. Civ. P. 127; OKLA. STAT., tit. 12, § 3236; OR. R. 45.
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admission requests exclusive of those addressed to the genuineness of documents.33'
None of the other four states, however, allow an attorney to exceed the limit simply
by attaching a declaration for additional discovery. All require a motion to the
court.
33 2
The second potential admission request innovation comes from Illinois and
Michigan. In both states, a party can send copies of public records to an adversary
for review. Under such circumstances, the genuineness of the copies is deemed
admitted unless the adversary makes a formal objection.333
F Expert Witness Information
The survey uncovered about a half-dozen potential innovations in discovery of
expert witnesses' identity, background, prior reports, and expected testimony.
California currently uses the "exchange of expert witness lists" procedure to address
these matters. 3 This exchange occurs only if demanded by some party to the case,
but if any party demands it, then all parties must comply. Following the exchange,
the experts may be deposed.335 For the most part, Nevada has adopted the
"exchange" process as well.336
Other courts, however, have taken a different path. Since 1993, the federal
courts have required automatic disclosure of testifying expert witness information.337
Automatic disclosure has been followed not only by the state courts who have
generally adopted the federal disclosure requirements, but by a couple of others as
well.338 For its part, Colorado has modified the federal disclosure requirement by
sequencing expert disclosure; rather than the simultaneous disclosure contemplated
by the federal courts, Colorado has the plaintiff disclose first, the defendant second,
and rebuttal experts third.339
In addition to the disclosure provisions, several states have enacted some other
general provisions that may be worth examining. Discovery of experts has
traditionally been wrapped up in the law governing an attorney's work product. The
work product doctrine attempts to give attorneys the freedom to examine both the
positive and the negative aspects of their cases. Since, in many cases, consultation
also with experts is essential to this examination, a party who had to first pay for and
331. NEV. R. Civ. P. 36(c).
332. COLO. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2); ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26(b); IOwA R. Civ. P. 127; NEV. R. Civ. P. 36(c).
333. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 216(d); MICH. CT. R. 2.312(E).
334. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(a)(1) (West 1998).
335. Id. § 2034(i).
336. NEV. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101 (offer to disclose names of medical experts in
medical malpractice cases).
337. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(c). The date of the disclosure is either set by the parties, by the court, or occurs
no later than ninety days prior to trial. Id.
338. See, e.g., CONN. R. SUPER. CT. (Civil) § 13-4, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-226(b) (2001) (requiring automatic
disclosure of discovery).
339. COLO. CT. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(C).
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then turn over, through discovery, the results of such expensive consultations would
have much less incentive to do so. Once the decision has been made to present an
expert's testimony at trial, however, fairness to the adversary tips the balance in
favor of at least some exchange of information about the expert and his or her
expected testimony. Accordingly, most jurisdictions have distinguished between
experts who have been retained (or who are employed by a party as an in-house
expert) but who are not planned to be called at trial and those who have been
retained (or employed) and are expected to be called.
This basic dichotomy, however, oversimplifies the possible classifications of
experts. For example, many jurisdictions, including California, have implicitly
recognized that some experts, notably treating physicians, may testify as experts
even though they have not been retained or employed by any party to provide such
testimony.3 40 Several states are more direct in their recognition of this distinction
among classes of testifying experts. For example, Colorado and Missouri expressly
recognize that experts may not necessarily be either employed or retained by the
party intending to call them at trial; both specify discovery obligations for such
experts.341 Illinois reaches a similar result simply by requiring that the identity,
background and opinions of all "opinion" witnesses, whether retained or not, must
be disclosed in answers to interrogatories.342 Iowa expressly excludes percipient
witness experts from any limitations on discovery of experts. 343 And South Carolina
expressly acknowledges that parties have no duty to produce information developed
from an informally consulted expert.
Although the use of experts in a case often adds greatly to litigation expenses,
especially when the testimony of dueling experts turns a case into a battle of the
experts, courts have shown no real interest in "arms control." Thus, virtually no
presumptive numerical limits apply to the use of experts. The two exceptions to date
340. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2034(a)(1) & (2) (West 1998). See generally HOGAN & WEBER, supra
note 41, at § 10.1; see also notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
341. COLO. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2)(B); MISSOURI R. Civ. P. 56.01(b)(5). Under the Colorado provision, the two
classes are: (1) "a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony, or whose duties as
an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony;" and (2) any other "witness who may be called
to provide expert testimony." Id. The disclosure duties are most extensive for the first class of experts.
The Missouri provision also distinguishes between retained or employed and non-retained or employed
testifying expert witnesses. It states:
A party, through interrogatories, may require any other party to identify each non-retained expert
witness, including a party, whom the other party expects to call at trial who may provide expert witness
opinion testimony by providing the expert's name, address, and field of expertise. For the purpose of
this Rule 56.01 (b)(5), an expert witness is a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, experience,
training, or education giving testimony relative to scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence. Discovery of the facts known and opinions
held by such an expert shall be discoverable in the same manner as for lay witnesses. Id.
342. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 213(g).
343. IowA R. Civ. P. 125(A)(l)(c).
344. S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(b).
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are Alaska and Arizona. Alaska limits experts to three per side.3 45 Arizona has a
presumptive limit of one independent expert per side.346
During the exchange of expert witness information, California requires the
attorney for a party to sign a declaration describing the background and expected
testimony of retained experts. 347 Although its overall practices are different-using
interrogatories rather than exchanged declarations-Iowa requires the retained,
testifying expert to personally sign the document containing the information.348
Utah, however, excuses the testifying expert from having to author the report
regarding his or her expected testimony.349 New Jersey takes a slightly different tack.
It requires the attorney for any party who sends copies of expert reports in response
to a discovery request to certify that there are no other relevant reports by that expert
available.35°
A testifying expert's fees are usually a subject of interest to other parties.
California requires the parties to an exchange to include in the attorney's declaration
"a statement of the expert's hourly and daily fee for providing deposition testimony"
and for consulting with the retaining attorney.' Additional information about the
expert's prior testimony and relevant fees can be developed if, as usually occurs, the
expert is deposed after the information exchange. Florida, however, allows extensive
discovery by interrogatories of a testifying expert's prior testimony and financial
arrangements with retaining counsel.352 If an expert is deposed, Texas requires the
345. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D).
346. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(D). If the parties on a side cannot agree, then either the court designates the
expert, or, if good cause is shown, may allow more than one expert. Id.
347. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(f)(2) (West 1998).
348. IOwA R. Civ. P. 122(c)(1); OR. R. 4003.5.
349. UTAH R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3).
350. N.J. CT. R. 4:18-4.
351. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2034(f)(2)(E) (West 1998).
352. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(4)(A)(iii)(l)-(3). The rule provides:
(iii) A party may obtain the following discovery regarding any person disclosed by interrogatories or
otherwise as a person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial:
I. The scope of employment in the pending case and the compensation for such service.
2. The expert's general litigation experience, including the percentage of work performed
for plaintiffs and defendants.
3. The identity of other cases, within a reasonable time period, in which the expert has
testified by deposition or at trial.
4. An approximation of the portion of the expert's involvement as an expert witness,
which may be based on the number of hours, percentage of hours, or percentage of
earned income derived from serving as an expert witness; however, the expert shall not
be required to disclose his or her earnings as an expert witness or income derived from
other services.
An expert may be required to produce financial and business records only under the most unusual
or compelling circumstances and may not be compelled to compile or produce nonexistent documents.
Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to
scope and other provisions pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule concerning fees and expenses
as the court may deem appropriate.
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deposing party to pay fees for the expert's time spent preparing for and giving the
deposition, as well as reviewing and correcting the transcript.353
Two other provisions are worth noting. Iowa and Pennsylvania address the
substance of an expert's trial testimony. They preclude trial testimony that is
different from the expert's deposition testimony, but permit the expert to testify
about matters that were not inquired into during discovery.354 Finally, absent the
opposing party's consent, Hawaii expressly precludes ex parte contacts with an
opposing party's retained expert.355
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, should the California Law Revision Commission decide to take
up discovery reform as one of its topics, it will find plenty of possible innovations
to consider. This report has made no attempt to make specific recommendations
regarding specific innovations. It also has not fully evaluated the possible
innovations to determine how much, if at all, they might further the goals of
discovery reform. It is simply a starting point for a much more detailed
conversation.
Should the Commission decide to initiate that conversation, the author
recommends that it bring into the dialog as many of the different voices on
discovery reform as possible. Many of the possibilities catalogued here, of course,
will be quite controversial among the many parties interested in the civil litigation
process. A collaborative approach to discovery reform, facilitated by the
Commission, among the various stakeholders offers the greatest potential for long-
term acceptance by both the general public and the legal community.356
353. TEx. R. Civ. P. 195.7.
354. IOWA R. Civ. P. 125(d); PA. R. Civ. P. 4003.5.
355. HAw. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(iii); PA. R. Civ. P. 4003.6 (health care experts).
356. The author, an Associate of the California Center for Public Dispute Resolution, a joint project of
California State University-Sacramento and the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, would be
happy to discuss with the Commission the feasibility and possible design of such a collaborative.
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